Covering: Mutable Characteristics and Perceptions of Voice in the U.S. Supreme Court by Chen, Daniel L. et al.
COVERING: MUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND PERCEPTIONS OF VOICE
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Daniel L. Chen, Yosh Halberstam, and Alan Yu∗
Abstract The emphasis on “fit” as a hiring criterion has raised the spectrum of a new form of subtle
discrimination (Bertrand and Duflo 2016). Under complete markets, correlations between malleable char-
acteristics and outcomes should not persist (Becker 1957). Yet using data on 1,901 U.S. Supreme Court
oral arguments between 1998 and 2012, we document that voice-based snap judgments based on lawyers’
identical introductory sentences, “Mr. Chief Justice, (and) may it please the Court?”, predict court out-
comes. The connection between vocal characteristics and court outcomes is specific only to perceptions
of masculinity and not other characteristics, even when judgment is based on less than three seconds of
exposure to a lawyer’s speech sample. Consistent with employers mistakenly favoring lawyers with mas-
culine voices, perceived masculinity is negatively correlated with winning and the negative correlation
is larger in more masculine-sounding industries. The first lawyer to speak is the main driver. Among
these petitioners, males below median in masculinity are 7 percentage points more likely to win in the
Supreme Court. Female lawyers are also coached to be more masculine and women’s perceived femininity
predict court outcomes. Republicans, more than Democrats, vote for more feminine-sounding females,
while Democrats, but not Republicans, vote for less masculine-sounding men. A de-biasing experiment
finds that information reduces 40% of the correlation between perceived masculinity and perceived win,
and incentives reduce another 20%. A model shows how the information treatment identifies statisti-
cal discrimination and the incentives treatment identifies taste. Perceived masculinity explains additional
variance relative to and is orthogonal to the best random forest prediction model of Supreme Court votes.
Keywords: Gender, identity, speech, judicial decision making, JEL codes: J15, J78, K41
∗Daniel L. Chen, daniel.chen@iast.fr, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Uni-
versity of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France; dchen@law.harvard.edu, LWP, Harvard Law School; Yosh Halberstam,
yosh.halberstam@utoronto.ca, University of Toronto, Economics Department; Alan Yu, aclyu@uchicago.edu, University of
Chicago, Linguistics Department. First draft: October 2014. Current draft: August 2016. The most recent version of this article is
available at: http://users.nber.org/∼dlchen/papers/Covering.pdf. This work was partially supported by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the European Research Council, Humanities Division of the University of Chicago, the
Connaught Fund at the University of Toronto, the Swiss National Science Foundation, and Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
We thank Michael Boutros and Dennis Luo for invaluable research assistance. We thank seminar participants at the Amsterdam
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making, Association for Society, Religion, Economics,
and Culture Conference, Behavioral Economics and Experimental Research Summer School, the European University Institute,
Université de Paris II, Stockholm University, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Chicago, University of Glasgow, Uni-
versity of Michigan, University of Toronto, Canadian Economic Association, Linguistics Society Annual Meeting, and the Tokyo
Laboratory Phonology Conference.
1
1 Introduction
Civil rights law is populated with plaintiffs who were punished for being different. Courts
routinely distinguish between immutable and mutable characteristics, and between being a
member of a legally protected group as opposed to behavior associated with that group, which
is not protected (Yoshino 2006). Legal theorists suggest that discrimination, once aimed at
entire groups, now aims at subsets that refuse to cover, which means to assimilate to dominate
norms (Goffman 1963). Mutable characteristics have recently entered economic models of
identity formation (Austen-Smith and Fryer Jr 2005). One sentence—but no data—is devoted
to malleable characteristics in two summaries of the empirical literature (Bertrand and Duflo
2016; Neumark 2016): “Recently, the emphasis on ‘fit’ [of] a prospective employee ... as a
hiring criterion has raised the spectrum of a new form of subtle discrimination.” (Whether
this is viewed as a bad thing, of course, depends on one’s attitude towards fit.) For example,
African-Americans cannot be fired for their skin color, but they could be for wearing cornrows.
Potential jurors cannot be struck for their ethnicity, but can be for speaking a foreign language.
Women cannot be fired for their gender, but can be penalized for becoming mothers. Jews and
Muslims cannot be discharged from the US military or suspended from French public schools
for their religion, but they can be for covering their head. Female Indonesian police applicants
cannot be rejected for being female, but can be for failing virginity tests (Chen 2004).
Throughout history, when dominant groups ask subordinate groups to cover, or when courts
make employment contingent on covering, it is perceived to legitimize second-class citizenship
for the subordinated group (Balkin 2011). Should we understand, as constitutional scholars
argue, such legally sanctioned differential treatment to be harmful—are individuals “punished”
for not conforming when it comes to mutable characteristics (Yoshino 2000)? This distinction
between being and doing incentivizes assimilation, a topic that is relevant in a wide variety
of contexts: EU refugee policy’s focus on integration, the tragic outcomes of non-assimilation
when it pertains to ethnic-religious conflict, and contemporary discussions of trauma, micro-
aggression, and safe spaces, for example in the topic of sexual harassment, where it was once
perceived that women needed to assimilate to the dominant machismo culture of workplace
environments (Chen and Sethi 2011).
Economists have recognized the importance of assimilation in identity formation (Fryer and
Torelli 2010) and documented its psychological costs using proxies in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (Mueller-Smith 2013). When it comes to how one speaks, minorities’ choice
of diction have been found to be associated with long-run labor market outcomes (Grogger
2011). Female lawyers routinely pay coaches to sound more masculine (Starecheski 2014),
while men with non-masculine voices are disadvantaged in the labor market (Case 1995). Vocal
similarity is important for maintaining social relationships in both animals and humans (Toft
and Wright 2015; Giles and Powesland 1997). But is it homophily–speaking in the particular
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manner of certain identity groups–that engenders trust? It is hard to know the mechanism
behind differential treatment of voice, much less whether there is even differential treatment,
as the content of speech may change.
The roots of discrimination are perceived to originate in communication difficulties across
groups (Lang 1986; Lazear 1999), which can lead to mistrust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization has been linked to lower economic growth and higher in-
equality (Mauro 1995). During the process of fractionalization, individuals arguably begin to
speak differently. Does this mitosis of sounds lead to mistrust of individuals who are audi-
bly different? We generally distinguish between economic or statistical discrimination (when
people are treated differently because they are believed to be less productive (Phelps 1972;
Arrow 1973)) and prejudice (when people are treated differently because of animus–a distaste
despite its economic consequences (Becker 1957)). While statistical discrimination focuses on
information as the source of discrimination, prejudice focuses on preferences. Modern inter-
pretations blur the boundary between information and preferences. Endogenous information
acquisition can be due to preferences (Brewer 1988), and what appear to be preferences can be
due to Type I (automatic, cognitive, unconscious) instead of Type II (reflective, motivational,
conscious) thinking (Uhlmann and Cohen 2005). Complete markets can eliminate misbeliefs,
so correlations persist only if there exists animus from the marginal employer (Becker 1957).
The prior literature has focused on immutable characteristics, where inequality is determined
by the tastes of the potentially smaller set of employers who are on the margin of hiring one
individual or another. With mutable characteristics, more employers can be marginal; entire
industries were deemed to be systematically more harassing when it came to hostility to female
employment (Hersch 2011).
A classical interpretation of Becker (1957) would predict under complete markets that prej-
udice would also not survive as prejudiced employers in a competitive market will be forced
to shut down in the long run because they sacrifice profits by discriminating. However, a large
number of correspondence studies find evidence for discrimination (e.g., Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan 2004), and labor market inequality is associated with prejudicial attitudes (Charles
and Guryan 2008). Yet it is hard to know the drivers of inequality: separating prejudice from
statistical discrimination is challenging, since we typically lack data on productivity (Heck-
man and Siegelman 1993; Neumark 2016). Innovative experiments with sports card collectors
(List 2004), maze solvers (Mobius and Rosenblat 2006), and Indian schoolchildren (Rao 2014)
(to name a few) disentangle these two types of discrimination, but it is hard to do so in
a real-world, high-skill, high-stakes setting. We analyze oral arguments before the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOTUS), in which winning is the productivity measure, us-
ing snap judgments of voice samples (e.g., Sample 1 (https://goo.gl/ZPdCkU) and Sample
2 (https://goo.gl/mbhuLF)) from 1,901 U.S. Supreme Court petitioner and respondent oral
arguments, in which lawyers use identical introductory sentences: “Mr. Chief Justice, (and)
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may it please the Court?” The oral arguments are arguably high stakes. According to Justices,
“[y]our oral argument [is the] the most effective weapon you have got” (Chief Justice Roberts
2005) and “[it is like] building a cathedral” (Justice Jackson 1951). In his personal diaries,
Justice Blackmun graded the oral arguments of each attorney and the grades are correlated
with outcomes (Johnson et al. 2006; McAtee and McGuire 2007). A recent study finds that
Supreme Court cases from 1999–2013 collectively moved $140 billion in stock prices (Katz et
al. 2015).
Deep-voiced individuals are perceived to have greater leadership capacity and perceived to
be more competent, persuasive, confident and trustworthy (Klofstad et al. 2012; Tigue et al.
2012; Apple et al. 1979; Buller et al. 1996). Based on these perceptions, we present a simple
model where firms favor masculine voices because they believe a lawyer with a masculine voice
is more likely to win (statistical discrimination) or because they prefer lawyers with masculine
voices regardless of the economic consequences (prejudice). We use a de-biasing experiment
to distinguish between prejudice and statistical discrimination.
We find that first impressions of lawyers’ voices predict Supreme Court outcomes, and this
finding is specific to perceived masculinity: males are more likely to win when their voices are
perceived to be less masculine (Figure 1). The magnitude of the association remains stable
with controls for i) lawyer’s personal characteristics, ii) case history, iii) acoustics features,
iv) demographics of the raters, and v) other perceptual ratings of the voices, e.g., perceived
aggressiveness, confidence, competence, attractiveness, intelligence, trustworthiness, attitude,
respect, and empathy. No other perception is consistently predictive of Supreme Court out-
comes. Furthermore, in a mechanism experiment using reversed clips, perceived masculinity,
but not other perceptions, are strongly correlated across forward and reverse clips. Masculinity
perhaps may be an attribute of voice that is more salient, innate, or stereotyped than other
attributes.
When we analyze the petitioners and respondents separately, the petitioner—who is the
party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case–and speaks first–while the re-
spondent speaks in the second-half of the oral argument—is the main driver of the results,
which is consistent with the role of anchoring (a cognitive bias that describes the common hu-
man tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information offered) (Kahneman 2011).
Among these petitioners, being above or below median in masculine rating would be equiva-
lent to 7 percentage points in the likelihood of winning. This result along with the magnitude
of the stock market response to Supreme Court outcomes (Katz et al. 2015) suggests that it is
unlikely for salaries to offset this difference. We lack data on salaries paid to Supreme Court
lawyers with more masculine voices. In another setting, salaries are higher for more attractive
lawyers (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh 1998). If the same is true for
Supreme Court lawyers, and perceived masculinity of voice and physical attractiveness are
correlated, then the salary differential goes in the opposite direction of productivity, measured
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Figure 1: Voice-Based Masculinity Rating and Court Outcomes (p < 0.01)
Notes: Binned scatterplots illustrating the association between voice-based masculinity rating and court
outcomes. Binned scatterplots are a non-parametric method of plotting the conditional expectation function
(which describes the average y-value for each x-value).
as actual win rates.
Masculine voice is mutable to some extent. Both within- and between-lawyer variation drive
the association between perceived masculinity and case outcomes. Variation within the same
lawyers’ voices is found to account for roughly one-third of the total correlation while variation
between lawyers drives the remaining two-thirds. To be sure, lawyers may consciously or sub-
consciously perceive their cases to be weaker or stronger, which could lead their voices to
change, so we will be including controls for pre-trial characteristics and the best existing
prediction model of advocate wins.
Female lawyers are also coached to have their voices sound more masculine (Starecheski
2014; Kramer 1987; Orvice 1993; Atkinson 1984; Nallon 2014), and we find that the negative
correlation between court success and perceived masculinity extends to women. Less-masculine
sounding men and women (i.e., more-feminine sounding women) are more likely to win, and
this association is specific to perceived femininity for females and perceived masculinity for
males. Being above or below the median in perceived femininity corresponds to 5 percentage
points in likelihood of winning for females. If the male and female results are pooled together,
assuming that masculinity can be treated as the polar opposite of femininity (a controversial
assumption to be sure), the pooled results would be stronger. These results are consistent
with a model where less-masculine sounding lawyers need to be substantially better than
their more-masculine counterparts in order to be hired or retained by discriminatory firms.
Next, we document substantial heterogeneity in how judges’ votes correlate with perceived
masculinity. Democrats, but not Republicans, vote for less-masculine sounding men (Figure
2), while Republicans, more than Democrats, vote for more feminine-sounding females. (In
the higher intercept for Republicans, we see that Republicans favor males, as documented
previously by Szmer et al. (2010)). We verify that this heterogeneity is due to ideology rather
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Figure 2: Political Party and Response to Masculinity (p < 0.01)
than gender of the judge, though the number of judges is limited. A full exploration of the
reason for the ideological heterogeneity is beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, liberals
may wish to signal a preference for gender-neutral norms—and conservatives for traditional
gender norms—or gender-neutral sounding voices may signal liberal ideology and engender
trust (and vice versa for conservative ideology). Data on different types of cases suggests
that at least some of the time, Democrats and Republicans vote together for less-masculine
sounding males and more-feminine sounding females in technical areas such as taxation, which
rarely divide 5-4, where dividing 5-4 is a proxy for whether an area of law is overtly ideological.
Under complete markets, lawyers would have incentives to make their voice sound less
masculine. However, lawyers might not adjust if firms have the misbelief that masculine-
sounding lawyers are better or have a preference for masculine-sounding lawyers. Preference
for masculine-sounding lawyers may vary across industry. For example, prior research finds
that, in the private sector, CEOs with deeper voices manage larger companies (Mayew and
Venkatachalam 2012). In our setting, we observe stronger negative correlations between per-
ceived masculinity and court outcomes among private firms and stronger negative correlations
in industries with more masculine voices (p < 0.05) (Figure 20). There is essentially no cor-
relation between perceived masculinity and win rates for public lawyers advocating on behalf
of the government (Figure 3), which would seem to render less likely an explanation based on
ideological profiling. (Throughout the paper, the terms “firm” and “industry” are used to refer
to the category of the petitioner or respondent. The most represented petitioner categories in
the highest quartile of masculine voices are: penal institutions, telecommunications, and drug
manufacturers. The most represented petitioner categories in the lowest quartile of masculine
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Figure 3: Public vs. Private Firms and Response to Masculinity
industries are: United States, city or municipality, and employee or job applicant.)
These differences are consistent with a model where greater economic costs come with having
a preference for masculine-sounding lawyers and some industries may have stronger preferences
for masculine characteristics. These industries and firms would give up more in lost court wins
in order to employ masculine-sounding oral advocates.
The Supreme Court Bar is a heavily vetted and elite group of oral advocates, and firms
typically exercise great care in choosing who will argue their case. We find that the more
lawyers appear at the Supreme Court, the more masculine they sound regardless of whether
they won or lost the previous case. This pattern is inconsistent with lawyers learning to
sound less masculine, but may be consistent with Austen-Smith and Fryer’s (2005) ethnic
identity model, adapted by Grogger (2011) to study the linguistic choices of minorities. An
individual has a "two-audience" signaling problem, and in our application, the second audience
is potentially the client. We lack information about the selectors, but it is reasonable to think
the top of elite law firms with Supreme Court practices would be predominantly White and
non-Southern, and if so, their stereotypes would be more predictive of outcomes. Consistent
with this, we observe that White raters’ perceptions of masculinity were more predictive of
court outcomes (p < 0.05) and non-Southerners’ perceptions were more predictive of court
outcomes (p < 0.05). This difference suggests the perception of masculinity can differ based on
the stereotypes associated with the sound of a speaker’s words. Moreover, poor and non-White
individuals were less likely to correlate masculinity with winning (p < 0.05 for both), which
would be consistent with the behavioral response to stereotypes differing across individuals if
perceptions of winning precipitate choices.
The behavioral response to stereotypes may be due to tastes (prejudice) or information
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Figure 4: Feedback (p < 0.01), Incentives
(statistical discrimination). We execute a de-biasing experiment that provides information
and/or incentives in a 2x2 design to distinguish the two channels. We find that information
reduces 40% of the correlation between perceived masculinity and perceived win (Figure 4),
identifying the presence of statistical discrimination. Incentives further reduce another 20%
of the correlation when there is information, identifying the presence of prejudice. Incentives,
which erode the effect of taste, would have no effect if there is no differential taste (prejudice).
Finally, we further assess the robustness of the association between perceived masculinity
and court outcomes. To be sure, we cannot make strong causal inferences, and it is infeasible
to conduct an experiment in the Supreme Court that modifies the sound of a voice after
a lawyer speaks but before the Justice hears the words. However, we can assess the degree
to which omitted variables drive our results by comparing with the previous best prediction
models of Supreme Court votes (Katz et al. 2014). Random forest trees—a weighted non-
parametric model that forms weighted predictions based on nearest neighbors—can predict
how the judges will vote with 70% accuracy. Two results emerge from this comparison. First,
perceived masculinity is essentially orthogonal to the best prediction model. This indicates that
perceived masculinity is uncorrelated with pre-trial case characteristics and judge and court
trends used in the random forest model, even when these characteristics are combined in a
non-linear manner. As to why perceived masculinity is orthogonal to the random forest model,
the prediction model performs well in 9-0 and 0-9 cases but performs poorly in close cases, i.e.,
when decision makers are more indifferent. In contrast, perceived masculinity’s role emerges
at the case level rather than the vote level. This result suggests that perceived masculinity is
influential in close cases and for the swing voter, and is consistent with heuristics or biases
being more likely to influence decisions in hard or close cases. Second, in trying to predict the
Democratic votes for male petitioners, the previous best predictive model explains roughly
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6% of variance—a small amount, because it is a binary outcome—and including perceived
masculinity renders 6.3-6.4% of variance explained, which is 0.2-0.6 percentage points or 3-
10% more than the baseline.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background and theory.
Section 3 describes the experimental methods and data. Section 4 presents the baseline asso-
ciation between first impressions of lawyers’ voices and U.S. Supreme Court outcomes. It also
demonstrates the primacy of the first speaker, assesses the role of within- vs. between-lawyer
variation in accounting for the association, and explores whether the results extend to fe-
male lawyers. Section 5 investigates why first impressions of voice predict SCOTUS outcomes
considering lawyer characteristics, pre-trial case characteristics, judicial heterogeneity, firm
heterogeneity, and rater demographics. Section 6 documents that lawyers sound more mas-
culine the more they appear before the SCOTUS. It also reports the results of a de-biasing
experiment. Section 7 decomposes the explanation of variance using the best predictive models
of Supreme Court votes and data on acoustic features. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Theory
In theory of language, meanings of words are found in the context in which concepts are encountered.
Semantic competence, the ability to determine meaning, depends on one’s stereotypes associated
with a speaker’s words (Putnam 1973).
A large body of work examines how people speak – their vowels, pitch, diction, and intonation –
but there is relatively little evidence that speech variation beyond lexical choices (fluctuations
in the way one speaks holding the words fixed) matters in real-world behavior, and this is
where our paper comes in. Are vocal cues relevant in high-stakes policy-making settings such
as the U.S. Supreme Court even with advocates using identical sentences?
First impressions of voice are associated with the subsequent behavior of the perceiver in
mate selection, leader selection, housing options, consumer choices, and even stock market
outcomes in a recent vocal analysis of earnings conference calls (Nass and Lee 2001; Klofstad
et al. 2012; Purnell et al. 1999; Scherer 1979; Tigue et al. 2012; Mayew and Venkatachalam
2012). These findings are consistent with a broader behavioral literature on Type I vs. Type II
thinking – perhaps most famously, finding that facial cues predict electoral outcomes (Todorov
et al. 2005; Benjamin et al. 2009; Berggren et al. 2010) and that nonverbal behavior predicts
teacher evaluations in an experiment eliciting student ratings of silent clips of professors at
the beginning of the semester (Ambady and Rosenthal 1992) (to name a few). A recent study
finds that even when visual cues are present, potential employers rely more on voice-based
impressions of a job applicant than on visual cues (Schroeder and Epley 2015). The reliance on
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voice may have an evolutionary basis: infants use vocal cues as the first marker of in-group vs.
out-group membership (Kahneman 2011; Kinzler et al. 2007). The gendered differentiation of
masculine and feminine language has been argued to have a different evolutionary basis–males
would be selected for greater aggressivity and higher variance (Locke 2011), which in this case
would mean a higher probability of losing.
There is a variety of reasons why voice impressions should not matter. From a rational
perspective, information should override first impressions (Posner 1973). From an ideologi-
cal perspective, court outcomes are largely political and predetermined outcomes (Cameron
1993). From a legal perspective, legal decisions should be based on the legal content of the
argument (Kornhauser 1999). From an economic perspective, correlations between voice and
outcome should not persist as law firms and advocates adjust their behavior to eliminate such
correlations (Becker 1957; Knowles et al. 2001), whereas facial features may be less mutable
than voice and teaching evaluations lower stakes than SCOTUS outcomes. But from a behav-
ioral perspective, the way one speaks reveals a lot about one’s personality and identity (Babel
et al. 2013; Hodges-Simeon et al. 2010; McAleer et al. 2014; Bordalo et al. 2014), and previous
studies have found evidence suggesting that vocal cues can matter in settings as diverse as the
court room (Schubert et al. 2002) and U.S. Presidential debates (Gregory Jr and Gallagher
2002).
By and large, judges believe there is no such thing as bias (Edwards and Livermore 2008).
As Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito articulated, “[i]t’s not like we’re judging a moot court:
which lawyer is better? ... It’s the case, not the lawyer” (Biskupic et al. 2014). However, the
degree to which a lawyer’s words converge to a SCOTUS judge predicts the judge’s vote
(Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2012). Our study of the Supreme Court differs from previous
economic studies of ideological bias: while market pressures may drive identity effects in eco-
nomic behavior towards the rational model, behavioral anomalies in judicial decision-making
can have more permanent consequences (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007; Baker and Mezzetti
2012). Our study also differs from other studies of courtroom bias in that we focus on three
actors: the judge, the lawyer, and the firm.
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court bar has been characterized by the emergence
of an elite group of private sector attorneys not witnessed since the early 1800s (Lazarus
2008). Elite Supreme Court legal practices are increasingly led by “rainmakers” and landing a
Supreme Court case is incredibly important to such rainmakers. There are a few specialists,
most working on behalf of businesses, who have enjoyed heightened success (Fisher 2013). A
new Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar has also emerged (Morawetz 2011). The time when oral
advocates are selected by firms is when perceived masculinity may positively affect selection.
Positive selection may occur because deep-voiced individuals are perceived as having many
positive attributes (Klofstad et al. 2012; Tigue et al. 2012; Apple et al. 1979; Buller et al.
1996). Margaret Thatcher and George H. W. Bush were coached to be less shrill (Kramer
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1987; Orvice 1993). Via humming exercises, Thatcher made her voice more masculine by
the amount equivalent to half (https://goo.gl/8bMkut) the male-female difference (Atkinson
1984), though her natural voice occasionally slipped out (https://goo.gl/WNDgr0) (Nallon
2014). As women have entered the work force and positions of authority, their voices have
moved closer to a masculine standard (Pemberton et al. 1998) and have been rewarded for
doing so (Case 1995). This phenomenon is not limited to women or leaders: in an employment
discrimination case involving Sears, job applicants were asked: "Do you have a low-pitched
voice?” (EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1300). The employer preferred
employees with masculine voices, even if they performed worse on the job (Case 1995).
More formally, suppose there are two advocates M and F , who either win or lose. Consider
the following utility:
(1) Uv = αpiv + V
where piV = Prob(v wins) represents the individual’s beliefs about whether the advocate
chosen by him will actually win, and V represents the individual’s preference (taste) for
advocate V independent of the economic consequences. This taste can be based on a sense of
shared or opposing identity or it could be ideological (Chen and Schonger 2013; 2015; Chen
2010; 2013). In sum, an individual chooses an advocate based on his or her beliefs about
whether that lawyer will win, represented by the probability piV , and a taste for an advocate
with voice V . The parameter α represents stakes–e.g., “Billions of dollars at stakes in Supreme
Court power market fight” (Crawford and Malik 2016). To be sure, the event study of Katz et
al. (2015) looks at one stock per case whereas Crawford and Malik (2016) makes an estimate
for an entire industry, so these estimates of stakes are not strictly comparable.
Individuals will choose advocate F over M if and only if the difference in the probability of
F winning rather than M winning exceeds the relative taste individuals have for advocates
with voice M :
(2) α (piF − piM) ≥ d
where d ≡ M − F . Similarly, an individual chooses advocate M over F , if and only if, the
difference in beliefs in the probability of M winning over F winning exceeds the difference in
the taste for F over M , weighted by the stakes.
Suppose individuals are more likely to choose M over F . There are two reasons individuals
may choose M over F - information and taste, i.e., due to statistical discrimination (informa-
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tion, piF < piM) or prejudice (taste, d > 0). Information can be used to update one’s beliefs
about piF − piM , and any changes in behavior would be due to information. Likewise, the in-
centives to choose correctly erode the effect of taste on choices (piF − piM > dα). Any changes
in behavior would be due to existence of preference (taste) for a type of advocate independent
of the economic consequences. Incentives increase α, so any response would imply that d > 0.
In the experiment, if subjects perceive masculine voices to be more likely to win, their prior
beliefs are that piM > piF . To summarize,
• ∂(piF−piM )
∂Info
> 0 would be evidence of statistical discrimination
• ∂2(piF−piM )
∂Info∂Incentives
> would be evidence of prejudice
Analogous to a recent paper that structurally estimates the taste parameter (Rao 2014), if we
assume that only beliefs, taste, and stakes enter utility, then as α→∞, only large d (on the
order of US$10 million) explains the negative correlation between perceived masculinity and
court outcomes. Further, in industries with higher d > 0, masculine voices would do worse as
firms indulge in taste d at cost of α4piv.
In sum, this theoretical analysis motivates a de-biasing experiment where we randomize
both the information and the incentives. We will investigate whether information reduces
the correlation between perceptions of masculinity and perceptions of winning. We will then
investigate if incentives further reduces this correlation. Providing incentives in the model is
analogous to increasing the stakes, which would reduce the influence of taste on choices, but
only if there is a positive taste for masculine lawyers. If the only reason that decision makers
prefer masculine lawyers is due to misbeliefs, then only information would affect decisions. In
the model, this would mean that d
α
would be 0 regardless of the size of α.
3 Experiment
3.1 Design
Oral arguments at the SCOTUS have been recorded since the installation of a recording
system in October 1955. The recordings and the associated transcripts were made available
to the public in electronically downloadable format by the Oyez Project (http://www.oyez.
org/), which is a multimedia archive at the Chicago-Kent College of Law devoted to the
SCOTUS and its work. The audio archive contains more than 110 million words in more
than 9000 hours of audio synchronized, based on the court transcripts, to the sentence level.
Oral arguments are, with rare exceptions, the first occasion in the processing of a case in
which the Court meets face-to-face to consider the issues. Usually, counsel representing the
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competing parties of a case each have 30 minutes in which to present their side to the Justices.
The Justices may interrupt these presentations with comments and questions, leading to
interactions between the Justices, the lawyers and, in some cases, the amici curiae, who are
not a party to the case but nonetheless offer information that bears on the case not solicited
by any of the parties to assist the Court.
This paper presents analysis of clips taken from the period 1998–2012. Over 80% of the
advocates featured in these clips argued only once before the SCOTUS, and 169 advocates in
the sample—about 15%—were female. We hired 748 MTurk raters from the U.S. to evaluate
1,901 audio clips comprising 1,085 lawyers. Each rater evaluated 60 random clips, producing
roughly 20 ratings for each clip. Six clips were randomly chosen to be played twice for each
rater, resulting in each rater providing a total of 66 evaluations.
A little over half (382) of the 748 MTurk raters were female. Two-thirds were aged between
20 and 35 years old, and one-third were older than 35. Likewise, one-third indicated they had
some college education, whereas one-third claimed to have a bachelor’s degree. The median
income of those who completed the survey was about US$40,000. Their racial and geographical
distribution broadly reflects that of the U.S. population. In a separate paper documenting only
the correlation and not the mechanisms presented in this paper, Chen et al. (2016e) shows
that correlation between the share of participants from a given state and the state share of
US population is 0.9588.
The raters were asked to use headphones and to rate on a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7
(high) the characteristics of masculinity, attractiveness, confidence, intelligence, trustworthi-
ness, and aggressiveness. These six traits were selected based on previous research on listeners’
perceptual evaluations of linguistic variables (Eckert 2008; Campbell-Kibler 2010; McAleer et
al. 2014). They are also similar to the ones used in Todorov et al. (2005), which presented
subjects with pictures of electoral candidates’ faces and asked them to rate their perceived at-
tributes. That study found that only perceptions of competence predicted election outcomes.
To assess whether raters were making global judgments about candidates that were not spe-
cific to competence, the authors also elicited judgments of candidates’ intelligence, leadership,
honesty, trustworthiness, charisma, and likability. We take a similar approach by analyzing
how judgments of masculinity, while correlated with judgments of other voice attributes, are
the only ones that predict court outcomes in a consistent and robust manner. Subjects were
also asked to predict whether the lawyer would win.
Male and female lawyers were rated in separate blocks, such that participants either rated
male advocates or female advocates but not both, so raters would not be comparing females
and males on the degree of masculinity. Female lawyers were rated in terms of femininity
instead of masculinity.
We randomized the order and polarity of the questions (e.g., “very masculine” and “not at
all masculine” would appear on the left and right of a 7-point scale, respectively, or on the
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Figure 5: Screenshot of Experiment
right and left in the opposite polarity); the order and polarity of questions were held fixed for
any particular rater to minimize cognitive fatigue. For additional nudges across experimental
designs, to ensure attention by the rater, we included listening attention checks, which if raters
failed they would be dropped from the sample. There were six alertness trials, three with beeps
and three without. The beep comes at the beginning of the lawyer’s voice. Subjects were asked
if they heard a beep, but not to rate the lawyer’s voice.
Several clips were repeated to check for intra-rater reliability. Raters were also asked to rate
the quality of the recording. While there is no time limit on how long a subject can spend
on each trial, they were given a minimum of 5 seconds to respond; they were not allowed to
proceed to the next trial until the 5 seconds was up (and all the questions completed) in order
to ensure that subjects were given enough time to complete the ratings and to discourage
them from speeding through the trials. An example of what each questionnaire looked like is
provided in Figure 5. No information regarding the identity of the lawyer or the nature of the
case was given to the participants. Other screenshots of the experimental instructions are in
the Appendix.
To control for the possibility of within-voice modeling by raters, instead of the basic design
(in which the listener was presented with one voice sample and rates the sample on all scales),
we also employed a design with only one question, randomly selected for each voice sample.
This is a design perturbation based on earlier pilots with only 60 clips and fewer subjects. Each
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Figure 6: Correlation in Average Voice Perceptions across Experiments (Many vs. One At-
tribute)
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Notes: This figure plots the mean rating of sixty voice samples in the pilot, where the x-axis reflects mean
ratings obtained from raters who were asked to rate each advocate on the full set of attributes, whereas the
y-axis reflects the mean ratings obtained from raters who were randomly assigned to rate each advocate on
only one attribute.
voice clip was played aloud only once, in order to capture the respondents’ first impressions –
and to avoid them over thinking their responses (Ballew and Todorov 2007). We added and
removed a few additional questions, such as perceived age and perceived standard english, and
varied the way we asked respondents whether the lawyer should win the case versus how likely
do they think the lawyer will win the case (Question 2 of Figure 5). We find a high degree
of correlation of individual perceptions across experimental designs and stimulus presentation
methods (see Figure 6).
Figure 6 plots the mean rating for each of the advocates using the two approaches discussed
above. The x-axis reflects the the mean ratings obtained from raters who were asked to rate
each advocate on the full set of attributes, and the y-axis reflects the mean ratings obtained
from raters who were randomly assigned to rate each advocate on only one attribute. The
ratings are highly correlated across these experimental designs, suggesting that trait judgments
obtained from listening to a voice are quite stable.
We also reversed the voice clips (for a sample: forward (https://goo.gl/3gCMTx) and re-
versed (https://goo.gl/zhzzhc) clip) so the sentence no longer sounded anything like English.
The speech features are also different, but some acoustic information is similar. This is a mech-
anism experiment based on the pilot sample with only 60 clips and 10 ratings per reversed clip.
As Figure 7 shows, most attributes exhibit some correlation, but generally very weak ones.
The only personality attribute that shows a strong correlation is masculinity. This result sug-
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Figure 7: Correlation in Voice Perceptions across Experiments (Forward vs. Reversed Clips)
Notes: This figure plots the rating, where the x-axis reflects ratings obtained from raters who were asked to
rate each advocate on the forward version of the clip, whereas the y-axis reflects the ratings obtained from
raters who were assigned to rate each advocate on the reversed version of the clip. The number represents
the Pearson’s r.
gests that masculinity may be more salient, innate, or stereotyped than other attributes, such
as aggressiveness, confidence, competence, attractiveness, intelligence, or trustworthiness.
3.2 Measurement
We measure perceived masculinity in three ways. Within-rater normalization entails adjusting
for cross-subject variability in the cardinality and spread of ratings. Let attributeitw be subject
w ’s perception of a given attribute of advocate i in case t, where attribute refers to any one
of the six traits (i.e., attractive, confidence, etc.) and the perceived likelihood of winning. The
normalized rating is given by
(1) ̂attributeitw = attributeitw − attributew
σ (attribute)w
,
where attributew is the average perception of a given attribute across rater w ’s advocate
ratings and σ (attribute)w is the standard deviation of these ratings. As a result, for each
rater w, ̂attributeitw is a continuous measure with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
We provide summary statistics of these measures for male advocates in Table Ia.
One concern with an online setting like MTurk for conducting surveys is that subjects can
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics
(a) Rating-by-Audio Data (normalized)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Outcome 33666 0.518 0.500 0.000 1.000
Masculine 33666 0.014 0.989 -6.308 4.031
Confident 33666 0.002 0.993 -4.641 4.172
Attractive 33666 -0.005 0.992 -8.001 5.701
Intelligent 33666 -0.006 0.999 -8.001 8.001
Trustworthy 33666 -0.007 0.996 -8.001 8.001
Aggressive 33666 0.002 0.994 -7.261 8.001
Likely winner 33666 0.000 0.995 -5.787 8.001
(b) Audio-Level Data (average of normalized)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Outcome 1634 0.517 0.500 0.000 1.000
Masculine 1634 0.015 0.540 -2.108 1.537
Confident 1634 0.003 0.465 -2.165 1.192
Attractive 1634 -0.006 0.425 -1.513 1.326
Intelligent 1634 -0.006 0.370 -1.739 0.893
Trustworthy 1634 -0.006 0.323 -1.484 1.048
Aggressive 1634 0.004 0.421 -1.733 1.408
Likely winner 1634 0.001 0.441 -2.402 1.216
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of normalized perceptual ratings.
try to do the task as quickly as possible so they can move onto the next paid task, and
occasionally vary their responses to make it look like they are carrying out the task properly.
If some raters only occasionally change their numbers to give the appearance that they are
doing work, normalization puts more weight on those individuals who are providing less signal
in their ratings, which would yield less precise associations with outcomes. Thus, our second
measure uses raw ratings, which give more weight to raters who provide more signal amid
greater variance in their ratings.
Chen et al. (2016e), which focused on normalized ratings and does not explore any of the
mechanisms, addresses this issue in a different manner. It begins by examining rater inconsis-
tency using the six clips that were randomly chosen to be played again. Then, when excluding
survey participants who score in the bottom quintile of rating consistency, it reports that the
results strengthen. It also reports results are robust after excluding outliers, defined by ex-
ceeding the Mahalanobis distance threshold. Then, when excluding participants who exceeded
this threshold on more than one third of their ratings, the results strengthen. In this paper, we
have decided to use the more conservative approach and include these ratings in our analysis
since we might prefer to avoid selection of ratings. Even outliers might represent the overall
distribution of perceptions. What appear to be outliers may be the legitimate perceptions of a
minority demographic. Our goal is to document a relationship between these perceptions and
outcomes. The fact that the results using normalized ratings strengthened when restricting to
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subjects who displayed greater intra-rater reliability suggests that our reason for preferring
the unnormalized measure may be justified.
A third measure of voice attribute uses the average scores of each lawyer, whereby we match
only one voice measure to each oral argument. To do this, we take the average ratings across
raters as follows:
(2) ̂attributeit = 1|Wit|∑w ̂attributeitw,
whereWit is the set of raters who rated the voice of advocate i in case t. In Table Ib, we report
summary statistics of these average measures. Notice that the data is now transformed such
that each observation represents a single measure of voice for each oral argument, whereas
observations in the micro-level data consist of multiple ratings. As expected, the variation
in trait judgments in the averaged data is reduced significantly. In particular, the standard
deviation of the masculine measure is 0.54. This also means that the coefficients in tables
need to be divided by 0.54 in order to be interpreted. The use of average scores assumes
that all perceptions are the same across individuals and that differences are due to classical
measurement error. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption; as Section 5 shows,
perception is very subjective.
There are 33,666 individual ratings, with roughly 20 ratings per oral argument. The standard
deviation of the raw ratings is about 1.5 (so coefficients need to be divided by 1.5 in order to
interpret the coefficients displayed in the relevant tables). There are more observations in the
analyses using raw ratings because a small minority of raters had no variation in their ratings,
so we exclude their data when calculating the normalized rating. Lack of variation in ratings
across voices is consistent with some raters disregarding the instructions. For robustness, we
present sets of analyses using all three measures in Section 4, but the raw ratings is our
preferred measure because it weights more heavily the raters who provide more signal amid
greater variance in their ratings. We will use the raw ratings when conducting mechanism
analyses in Section 5.
Sample clips were at the 10%-ile (https://goo.gl/ZPdCkU) and 90%-ile (https://goo.gl/mbhuLF)
in masculinity ratings (−0.7 and +0.65). Sample clips of the same lawyer is consistent with the
voice being mutable: 10%-ile (https://goo.gl/Gy4Ik7) and 90%-ile (https://goo.gl/NECVV1)
in masculinity ratings of the same lawyer (−0.54 and +0.2). Female sample clips also suggest
audible differentiation at the 10%-ile (https://goo.gl/txvHFz) and 90%-ile (https://goo.gl/uRbRci)
in femininity ratings (−0.6 and +0.48).
Strictly speaking, we want to highlight a distinction we want to make between mutable and
concealable, which is studied elsewhere and arguably pertain to small populations (Mueller-
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Smith 2013; Chen et al. 2014b). The sample clips suggest that a broad part of the population
are subject to stereotypes, which was recently formally modeled in Bordalo et al. (2014).
3.3 Empirical Strategy
We consider two empirical specifications to explore whether first impressions of lawyers’
voices predict U.S. Supreme Court outcomes. In the micro-level strategy, we estimate the
following equation:
(3) winit = α + ̂attribute′itwβ + x′itwγ + εitw,
where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether advocate i actually won case t, and
the key independent variables denoted by the vector attribute are continuous measures of the
advocate’s set of attributes in case t as perceived by the MTurk raters. Given the regression
equation, β represents the association between advocate traits and actual wins. We further
expand our analysis by including in some regressions additional covariates denoted by the
vector x.
To explore whether heterogeneity of the MTurk raters influence our findings, x includes
rater w’s age, gender, race, income, education, and state of residence. Further analyses also
include lawyer i’s characteristics, such as SCOTUS clerkships, age, number of clerkships, law
review, other graduate degree, law school tier, masculinity of first name (the number of males
divided by the number of females with that name in the census), number of previous SCOTUS
oral arguments, years since graduation, number of admitted courts, number of practice areas,
firm size, office size, and whether they are a law firm partner. We also control for pre-trial
characteristics of case t: category, region of origin, and lower-court characteristics–reversal
of trial court, opinion length, disagreement, political division, ideology, and number of self-
certainty words that proxy for confidence, ideological perfectionism, or fundamentalism. We
adjust the standard errors of the regression estimates for clustering at the case level (and
also multi-way clustering at the lawyer level and, later, the judge level). Petitioners and
respondents are presented separately. In the correlational analysis, Chen et al. (2016e) shows
that the baseline estimates are similar whether using linear probability, probit, or logistic
regressions, so we omit presenting that here.
In the case-level strategy, we estimate the following equation:
(4) winit = α + ̂attribute′itβ + x′itγ + εit.
In these regressions we cannot control for intra-rater rating correlations nor rater character-
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istics. For these reasons, the aggregated regression is generally viewed as too conservative in
terms of statistical precision (Bertrand et al. 2004). We provide regression results using both
the micro- and case-level strategies. Importantly, the interpretation of the magnitudes of the
association will differ depending on the level of aggregation.
3.4 Data Generating Process
The underlying data-generating process is halfway between the micro-level regression with 20
raters per advocate and the case-level regression with one rating per advocate. In the Supreme
Court, each of nine Justices forms his or her own perception. The corresponding micro-level
strategy is:
(5) judge votes for advocateitw = α + attribute′itwβ + x
′
itwγ + εitw,
where w subscripts for judge.
The outcome of the case is a function of the nine separate impressions of the advocate.
(6) winit = f (judge impression) = α + attribute′itβ˜ + x
′
itγ + εit.
Differences between the case outcome and the judge votes reveal whether the swing voter’s
behavior is linked to perceived masculinity.
Simulations of the data-generating process in Equation (7) and comparing β and β˜ yield two
separate observations. First, β is more significant than β˜ if attribute′itw is highly correlated
across attributes at the w-level, which is consistent with Bertrand et al. (2004). Moreover, β
is smaller than β˜ because σ(attribute′itw) > σ(attribute′it). The proper interpretation is in
terms of standard deviation units.
As a diagnostic, we directly examine the correlation across traits. In Table II, we show the
correlation in trait judgments in the micro-level strategy. The table shows that judgments are
highly correlated across traits. Principal components analysis shows that the voice judgments
clustered in one factor that explains 66 percent of the variation in the data. A separate
regression tree analysis yields masculinity and confidence in the final pruned tree.
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TABLE II
Correlation in Trait judgments (micro-level)
Variable Masculine Confident Attractive Intelligent Trustworthy Aggressive Likely winner
Masculine 1.0000
Confident 0.4418 1.0000
Attractive 0.3381 0.3604 1.0000
Intelligent 0.2332 0.4006 0.3477 1.0000
Trustworthy 0.2002 0.2658 0.3546 0.3678 1.0000
Aggressive 0.3448 0.4974 0.2296 0.2349 0.1017 1.0000
Likely winner 0.4133 0.5593 0.4387 0.4770 0.3968 0.3917 1.0000
4 SCOTUS Outcomes and Perceived Masculinity
4.1 Baseline
We examine the relationship between how people perceive certain voice attributes and whether
these perceptions can predict real outcomes. Focusing on male advocates, we find a robust
negative association between the perceived masculinity of male advocates and winning in the
Supreme Court (Figure 1). The result of a simple regression of the case outcomes (Win) on
Masculine indicates a negative association (−0.0098) between advocates who are perceived as
sounding masculine and their likelihood of winning their argument before the SCOTUS. This
estimate is halved with the inclusion of lawyer fixed effects in Column 2, so we see that both
within-lawyer changes and between-lawyer variance in perceived masculinity predict outcomes.
With the inclusion of the full set of trait judgments in Column 3, the coefficient estimates
increase to −0.012. In Column 4, the regression with lawyer fixed effects, the estimate is also
statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, the likelihood of winning a case is 0.86
percentage points lower with every one-standard-deviation increase of the masculine measure
(p < 0.01; Table III Column 4). This is roughly one-quarter of the gender gap: i.e., males
are 3.7 percentage points more likely to win than females. Table III Columns 5–8 present the
analogous specifications for the case-level strategy using the average normalized ratings, where
one standard deviation of masculinity score is associated with roughly 36 percentage points
in Column 8 (p < 0.1). (The standard deviation in average masculinity score is 0.54, which
divides the coefficient displayed in the table.) Petitioners win about 70% of cases, so the case-
level effect is sizable. The micro-level effect is smaller for the reasons previously described. The
effect size is subject to the usual caveats in the literature—they are not necessary conditions
for an outcome (Deaton 2010).1
Figure 1 displays the association between the perceived masculinity of male advocates and
Supreme Court wins using only within-advocate variation. In other words, this correlation
1A defendant who shares the same first initial as a judge receives 8% longer sentences, but this effect only
explains 0.03% variance (Chen and Prescott 2016). See also Angus Deaton’s NYU “Debates in Development”
lecture on the topic, where he describes causal effects as Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of a condition
which is Unnecessary but Sufficient (INUS).
21
TABLE III
Baseline Results (normalized ratings)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Micro level Case level
Masculine -0.00975 -0.00518* -0.0122* -0.00864*** -0.0314 -0.101 -0.0357 -0.195*
(0.00684) (0.00298) (0.00695) (0.00313) (0.0228) (0.0888) (0.0334) (0.109)
Confident 0.00738 0.00278 0.106 0.0316
(0.00465) (0.00269) (0.0666) (0.150)
Attractive -0.000228 0.00113 -0.00770 0.00688
(0.00481) (0.00242) (0.0457) (0.133)
Intelligent 0.00747* 0.00333 0.108* 0.125
(0.00401) (0.00215) (0.0583) (0.136)
Trustworthy -0.00305 0.000746 -0.0582 -0.00510
(0.00343) (0.00201) (0.0567) (0.123)
Aggressive -0.000718 -0.000359 -0.0209 -0.0375
(0.00415) (0.00227) (0.0546) (0.128)
Likely winner -0.00451 0.00406 -0.105 0.0885
(0.00419) (0.00275) (0.0708) (0.144)
Lawyer FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 35276 35276 33666 33666 1634 1634 1634 1634
Notes: Using normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is unconditionally
associated with case outcome. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome
controlling for lawyer fixed effects. Column 3 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case
outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings. Column 4 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings and lawyer fixed effects. Columns 5-8 repeat the
same tests but uses the average normalized rating per advocate. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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is driven entirely by changes across cases in the perceived masculinity of a given advocate
holding the other voice ratings (i.e., confidence, trustworthiness, etc.) constant. The figure
reflects the model presented in Column 4 of Table III and shows that the results are not
driven by outliers. No other personality dimension consistently predicts court outcomes, and
the perceptions are jointly significant at p < 0.05.
Next, we present our baseline results of estimating Equation (3), where Table IV uses raw
ratings. Point estimates are similar. The likelihood of winning a case is lower with every one-
standard-deviation increase of the masculine measure (p < 0.01), as we see in Column 4, and
slightly more significant than using the normalized ratings.
TABLE IV
Baseline Results (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Masculine -0.00707∗ -0.00346∗ -0.00975∗∗ -0.00674∗∗∗
(0.00413) (0.00184) (0.00440) (0.00201)
Confident 0.00417 0.00248
(0.00312) (0.00178)
Attractive -0.000821 0.00198
(0.00328) (0.00167)
Intelligent 0.00634∗∗ 0.00116
(0.00292) (0.00155)
Trust -0.00177 0.000510
(0.00264) (0.00155)
Aggressive 0.00182 0.000421
(0.00266) (0.00149)
Likely winner -0.00270 0.00265
(0.00315) (0.00211)
Lawyer FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 35330 35330 35329 35329
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is unconditionally
associated with case outcome. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome
controlling for lawyer fixed effects. Column 3 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case
outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings. Column 4 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings and lawyer fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
The association between the perceived masculinity of male advocates and Supreme Court
wins is robust to a participant-level analysis that controls for how participants correlate ratings
of different characteristics, and to a case-level analysis that uses only the average rating per
voice clip, as we see in Table V, where one standard deviation of the masculinity measure has
correspondingly larger associations in Column 1 and in Column 4. Moreover, with the case-
level data, in both Table V and in Columns 5-8 of Table III, we find that estimates produced
by variation in within-advocate voice ratings are significantly larger in magnitude than when
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using all advocates, including those who appear only once in our sample of oral arguments.
TABLE V
Baseline Results (raw ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Masculine -0.0279∗ -0.0767 -0.0369 -0.166∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0646) (0.0239) (0.0778)
Confident 0.0502 0.0358
(0.0431) (0.0970)
Attractive -0.0167 0.0562
(0.0349) (0.0933)
Intelligent 0.0907∗ 0.0398
(0.0464) (0.105)
Trust -0.0185 0.0305
(0.0461) (0.0948)
Aggressive 0.0160 -0.00136
(0.0378) (0.0836)
Likely winner -0.0796 0.0551
(0.0568) (0.119)
Lawyer FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1634 1634 1634 1634
Notes: Using the average raw rating per advocate, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is
unconditionally associated with case outcome. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome controlling for lawyer fixed effects. Column 3 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings. Column 4 tests whether perceived
masculinity is associated with case outcome controlling for other perceptual ratings and lawyer fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
Next, we examine the results from design and model perturbations. First, the predictive
effect of perceived masculinity is robust across several experimental designs. To address any
concerns regarding framing or the number of ratings, we present the results using the same 30
cases from our pilot with 2008 data, using different experimental designs to elicit perceptions
from the raters. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table VI, we report regression results using 60 ratings
per voice trait where following each recording, the rater was asked to rate the advocate on the
full set of traits. Columns 3 and 4 show the results using 60 ratings per voice trait where the
rater was randomly assigned to provide a perception of only one trait following each recording.
And finally, Columns 5 and 6 show the results using the method we ultimately adopted to elicit
perceptions for our full sample of oral arguments (i.e., the same selected 30 cases pulled out of
the full data used in the previous tables), but with only 20 ratings per voice trait. While there
are slight differences in magnitude across experiments, the results are very similar, further
demonstrating the robustness of our key findings on the connection between trait judgments
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TABLE VI
Robustness to Experimental Variation (normalized ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Masculine -0.224** -0.324** -0.219* -0.317 -0.197 -0.434**
(0.0846) (0.131) (0.124) (0.197) (0.140) (0.200)
Attractive -0.0654 -0.0616 0.111
(0.257) (0.242) (0.221)
Confident 0.404 0.346 0.167
(0.239) (0.342) (0.253)
Trustworthy -0.436 -0.347 0.285
(0.574) (0.488) (0.288)
Ratings per voice 60 60 60 60 20 20
Cross-lawyer ratings No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60 60 60 60 58 58
Notes: Using the average normalized rating per advocate, Columns 1-2 test whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcomes using 60 ratings per voice trait where following each recording, the rater was
asked to rate the advocate on the full set of traits. Columns 3-4 do the same, but the rater was randomly
assigned to provide a perception of only one trait following each recording. Columns 5-6 do the same using
the method ultimately adopted to elicit perceptions for the entire sample of oral arguments, but with only 20
ratings per voice trait. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
from advocates’ voices and SCOTUS outcomes.2 As such, our results are unlikely to be driven
by any specific choice of the number of ratings or framing.
Lawyers who are perceived as more masculine might be construed as being more dominant
and authoritative. It is noteworthy that the gendered differentiation of masculine and feminine
language has been argued to have a different evolutionary basis (Locke 2011). In the present
context, the fact that court outcome is negatively associated with masculinity points to a
possible connection with the discourse of dominance. Males are seen as being selected over
generations to be aggressive and dominant, but this selective pressure might be a double-
edged sword since these types of behaviors are more likely to lead to lethal confrontation. In
this context, the dominant and aggressive behavior of masculine-sounding lawyers might have
invited an adverse response from the court. To be sure, this is only one interpretation as to
explain why masculinity of voice may matter and in the Appendix we explore the extent to
which these constructs play a role in the decision process as judges deliberate court decisions.
In particular, we include additional elicitations where we control for perceived competence,
empathy, respect, and attitude. The results become larger and more statistically significant
at both the micro level (p < 0.05) and case level (p < 0.01), with an R-square of 0.02 and
0.17, respectively. The point estimate is 0.55 for the analog to Column 6 of Table VI. We
also confirm that the results are robust (and if anything, more significant) when we model
the court outcome in terms of mixed-effects logistic regression, which is often used in the
2Columns 5 and 6 have fewer observations than in Columns 1 to 4 because the final study dropped two clips
due to implementation error.
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Figure 8: Perceived Masculinity and Win Rate by Petitioner-Respondent Status
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linguistics literature, where the fixed effects include the attorney’s role and the random effects
are the case.
4.2 Petitioner
If we assume the primacy of first impressions on court decisions, the first person to argue
before the Justices should exhibit a stronger vocal first-impression effect. That is, the first
speaker may have a longer-lasting impact on the court and subsequent outcomes due to the
“anchoring” effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), in which individuals rely on an initial piece
of information to make subsequent judgments. The respondent speaks 30 minutes later.
Our analysis shows that the petitioner is the main driver of the correlation between per-
ceived masculinity and court outcomes. Similar to the general findings above, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the masculinity score of the petitioner is associated with a lower likelihood
of winning the case (p < 0.05; Table VII Column 4). For ease of interpretation, we can dis-
cretize the continuous rating measures at the lawyer level and observe that a below-median
masculinity rating corresponds to a roughly 7 percentage-point greater likelihood of winning
(Figure 8). No association between perceived masculinity and court outcomes is found among
the lawyers for the respondent. This finding supports the hypothesis that first impressions –
in this case, of the first lawyer to argue before the Justices – are disproportionately associated
with judicial decisions. We are unable to determine if the literature on Supreme Court oral
arguments always observes the petitioners’ characteristics to matter more (e.g., on the pattern
of questioning or on Justice Blackmun’s grading of advocates), as the published papers do not
make their data publicly available as far as we are aware, and none of the published tables or
figures allow an inference.
As a benchmark for comparison, Columns 3 and 6 in Table VII show the results using the
full sample of arguments; Column 6 includes lawyer fixed effects in addition to MTurk rater
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TABLE VII
MTurk Rater Characteristics and Voice Perception (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
Petitioner Respondent Both Petitioner Respondent Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Masculine -0.0198** 0.00742 -0.0123* -0.00766** 0.00136 -0.00879***
(0.00913) (0.00972) (0.00695) (0.00372) (0.00364) (0.00312)
Confident 0.00919 -0.00968 0.00747 0.00396 -0.00642* 0.00276
(0.00591) (0.00671) (0.00463) (0.00301) (0.00344) (0.00270)
Attractive -0.00134 -0.000508 -0.000239 -0.000188 0.00300 0.00103
(0.00641) (0.00679) (0.00481) (0.00275) (0.00326) (0.00242)
Intelligent 0.00744 0.00371 0.00743* 0.00291 -0.000169 0.00336
(0.00531) (0.00564) (0.00400) (0.00240) (0.00271) (0.00215)
Trustworthy 0.00142 -0.00949* -0.00314 0.00166 -0.00270 0.000696
(0.00448) (0.00505) (0.00342) (0.00237) (0.00266) (0.00201)
Aggressive -0.00493 0.000942 -0.000701 0.00280 -0.00429 -0.000389
(0.00533) (0.00584) (0.00414) (0.00265) (0.00299) (0.00227)
Likely winner -0.00237 -0.0145** -0.00441 0.00294 -0.000927 0.00414
(0.00542) (0.00599) (0.00419) (0.00293) (0.00348) (0.00276)
MTurker controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lawyer FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17665 16001 33666 17665 16001 33666
Notes: Using the normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome among petitioners, controlling for other perceptual ratings and for rater characteristics.
Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome among respondents,
controlling for other perceptual ratings and for rater characteristics. Column 3 tests the same for both sets of
advocates. Columns 4-6 do the same as Columns 1-3 and control for lawyer fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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controls. As expected, the coefficient estimates onMasculine are very similar to those obtained
in the baseline regression. The most interesting observation we obtain from Tables VII (using
normalized ratings) and VIII (using raw ratings) is that the predictive power stems from the
voice judgments of the petitioner, not the respondent, corroborating our conjecture that the
first speaker may have a long-lasting impact on the Court and subsequent outcomes. Further,
comparing Column 1 to Column 4, we see that nearly 40% of the magnitude of β1 stems from
within petitioner variation, whereas the other 60% stems from cross-petitioner variation in
trait judgments of masculinity. Overall, a one-standard-deviation increase in perceived mas-
culinity is associated with a 1.98 percentage-point lower likelihood of the petitioner winning
the case.
TABLE VIII
MTurk Rater Characteristics and Voice Perception (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
Petitioner Respondent Both Petitioner Respondent Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Masculine -0.0144∗∗ 0.00491 -0.00963∗∗ -0.00569∗∗ 0.000420 -0.00668∗∗∗
(0.00571) (0.00630) (0.00444) (0.00241) (0.00232) (0.00203)
Confident 0.00457 -0.00924∗∗ 0.00379 0.00314 -0.00520∗∗ 0.00233
(0.00390) (0.00438) (0.00314) (0.00194) (0.00219) (0.00179)
Attractive -0.000428 -0.00271 -0.00137 0.000228 0.00148 0.00152
(0.00447) (0.00479) (0.00332) (0.00185) (0.00235) (0.00169)
Intelligent 0.00323 0.00652 0.00662∗∗ 0.00187 0.00108 0.00201
(0.00390) (0.00425) (0.00298) (0.00177) (0.00204) (0.00157)
Trust 0.00279 -0.00475 -0.00221 0.00105 -0.000211 0.000673
(0.00351) (0.00399) (0.00267) (0.00189) (0.00213) (0.00156)
Aggressive -0.00156 0.00522 0.00182 0.00174 -0.000667 0.000554
(0.00347) (0.00372) (0.00272) (0.00179) (0.00199) (0.00151)
Likely winner -0.000989 -0.0101∗∗ -0.00258 0.00172 -0.00112 0.00235
(0.00415) (0.00452) (0.00320) (0.00228) (0.00261) (0.00216)
MTurker controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lawyer FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18542 16787 35329 18542 16787 35329
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcome among petitioners, controlling for other perceptual ratings and for rater characteristics. Column
2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome among respondents, controlling for
other perceptual ratings and for rater characteristics. Column 3 tests the same for both sets of advocates.
Columns 4-6 do the same as Columns 1-3 and control for lawyer fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
As described earlier, we have a large set of rater covariates. The rater characteristics are
given as categorical covariates, and we include indicator variables for each value the categorical
covariate takes. Specifically, the fully saturated model includes rater characteristics: age and
dummies for each racial group, income cohort, gender group, education level, and state of
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residence. In Tables VII and VIII, we present regression results with this set of controls.
4.3 Within vs. Between Variation
Thus far, we have found that first impressions of lawyers’ voices (specifically related to
perceived masculinity) predict U.S. Supreme Court outcomes. Males are more likely to win
when they are perceived as less masculine. Petitioners (the first lawyer to argue) are the main
driver. Since our findings persist removing cross-advocate variation, we now look more closely
at between vs. within variation among repeat advocates.
We partition the sample of advocates into two groups – those who argued only once during
the 15 years of our study and those who argued multiple times – which results in splitting
the voices roughly in half. We present the results in Tables IX (using raw ratings) and A.1
(using normalized ratings). The regression results, which do not control for lawyer fixed ef-
fects, suggest that experienced petitioners are the primary driver of the correlation between
perceived masculinity and outcomes, with a reduction in the likelihood of winning as the result
of an experienced petitioner perceived as sounding one-standard-deviation more masculine.
Note that since this table does not include lawyer fixed effects, the average of Columns 1 and
Column 4 in Table A.1 would roughly approximate Column 1 from Table VII. Comparing
Column 4 of Table VII and Column 4 of Table A.1 yields the inference that roughly 30% of
the magnitude of β1 stems from within-advocate variation among advocates who argued more
than once. Among experienced petitioners, roughly 30% of the association between perceived
masculinity and court outcomes comes from within-lawyer variation, while 70% comes from
between-lawyer variation.
29
TABLE IX
Advocate Experience at the SCOTUS and Outcomes (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
Petitioner Respondent Both Petitioner Respondent Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
argued only once argued more than once
Masculine -0.00189 0.00755 -0.000210 -0.0190∗∗∗ 0.00516 -0.0128∗∗
(0.00861) (0.00850) (0.00630) (0.00726) (0.00872) (0.00598)
Confident -0.000625 -0.00543 0.000428 0.00709 -0.0111∗ 0.00599
(0.00650) (0.00659) (0.00480) (0.00443) (0.00569) (0.00392)
Attractive -0.00295 -0.00947 -0.00676 -0.000407 0.00260 0.00167
(0.00728) (0.00654) (0.00507) (0.00531) (0.00653) (0.00442)
Intelligent 0.00297 0.00822 0.00805∗ -0.00000342 0.00461 0.00245
(0.00604) (0.00646) (0.00454) (0.00508) (0.00525) (0.00379)
Trust 0.00315 -0.00437 -0.00215 0.00348 -0.00474 -0.00149
(0.00573) (0.00533) (0.00397) (0.00418) (0.00574) (0.00354)
Aggressive 0.0000306 0.00685 0.00285 -0.00134 0.00445 0.00235
(0.00590) (0.00511) (0.00408) (0.00409) (0.00507) (0.00348)
Likely winner -0.00938 -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00367 -0.00228 0.00440
(0.00621) (0.00650) (0.00450) (0.00540) (0.00622) (0.00444)
Observations 8016 7950 15966 10526 8837 19363
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcome among petitioners who argued only once in the Supreme Court from 1998-2012. Column 2 tests
whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome among respondents who argued only once in
the Supreme Court from 1998-2012. Column 3 tests the same for both sets of advocates. Columns 4-6 do the
same as Columns 1-3 but among advocates who argued more than once. Standard errors are clustered by
case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
4.4 Gender
Since female lawyers are also coached to be more masculine (Starecheski 2014), this raises the
question of whether our findings are restricted to male advocates or whether they also extend
to female lawyers. Studies on voice-based social biases have repeatedly observed significant
differences in how listeners react to voices of different (perceived) genders (Babel et al. 2014).
We thus examine male and female lawyers separately for the association between perceived
masculinity (femininity) and court outcomes.
Our results extend to females: while an increase in perceived masculinity among male lawyers
correlates with a decrease in the likelihood of winning, the same degree of increase in perceived
femininity in female lawyers correlates with an increase in the likelihood of prevailing in a court
case (Figure 9). If “masculine” were the opposite of “feminine,” then the pooled results would
be stronger.
Another interpretation of our results–where we discretize the continuous rating measures
at the lawyer level–is that a below-median masculinity rating corresponds with a roughly 2
percentage-point greater likelihood of winning for males, but a below-median femininity rating
corresponds with an approximately 5 percentage-point lower likelihood of winning for females
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Figure 9: Graphical Illustration of Gender and Predicted Outcomes
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Notes: These figures present binned scatterplots illustrating the association between voice-based masculinity
(femininity) rating and court outcomes.
Figure 10: Perceptions of Masculinity (Femininity) and Advocate Win Rates
.4
4
.4
6
.4
8
.5
.5
2
.5
4
masculine feminine
Male Advocate Female Advocate
above median rating
below median rating
lik
eli
ho
od
 o
f w
inn
ing
(Figure 10).
Interestingly, the correlation with outcomes is specific to perceived femininity. In Tables
X (using raw ratings) and A.2 (using normalized ratings), we present our initial findings. In
Columns 1–4 we narrowly focus on the association betweenMasculine (Feminine) and the case
outcome without adding any additional covariates. It appears that while sounding masculine
is negatively correlated with winning the case for male advocates, female advocates who sound
more feminine are more likely to win. These results continue to hold in Columns 5–8 with
the inclusion of the full set of traits. Among petitioners, a one-standard-deviation increase
in perceived masculinity predicts a lower likelihood of winning for men; and, the correlation
between femininity and outcomes for female petitioners is positive.
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TABLE X
Voice Perceptions and Gender (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0118∗∗ -0.00707∗ 0.00991 0.0153∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.00975∗∗ 0.0131 0.0125∗
Feminine (0.00524) (0.00413) (0.00952) (0.00727) (0.00565) (0.00440) (0.00933) (0.00678)
Confident 0.00508 0.00417 -0.00821 0.00701
(0.00387) (0.00312) (0.00992) (0.00730)
Attractive 0.0000377 -0.000821 0.00280 -0.00587
(0.00445) (0.00328) (0.0112) (0.00743)
Intelligent 0.00244 0.00634∗∗ -0.00192 -0.00578
(0.00385) (0.00292) (0.0109) (0.00847)
Trust 0.00356 -0.00177 -0.00439 -0.00175
(0.00344) (0.00264) (0.00973) (0.00647)
Aggressive -0.00134 0.00182 0.00501 0.00243
(0.00345) (0.00266) (0.0102) (0.00786)
Likely winner -0.000977 -0.00270 0.00251 0.00361
(0.00411) (0.00315) (0.0108) (0.00785)
Observations 18543 35330 2543 5868 18542 35329 2543 5868
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcome among male petitioners. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case
outcome among male advocates. Columns 3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but among female advocates.
Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but also control for other perceptual ratings. Standard errors are
clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
In Tables XI, we examine the relationships at the case level, where the relationship with
perceived femininity remains robust and specific to perceived femininity; it is also larger, and
it appears primarily for the petitioner at the case level. We present regression results using the
normalized data in Table A.4, which shows that the qualitative findings are consistent with
the results using the raw data: perceptions of masculinity are negatively correlated with win
probabilities for male advocates, and perceptions of femininity are positively correlated with
win probabilities for female advocates.
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TABLE XI
Voice Perceptions and Gender (raw ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0498∗∗ -0.0279∗ 0.0829 0.125∗∗ -0.0773∗∗ -0.0369 0.273∗ 0.182
Feminine (0.0225) (0.0169) (0.0801) (0.0580) (0.0320) (0.0239) (0.154) (0.113)
Confident 0.0816 0.0502 -0.247 0.0136
(0.0540) (0.0431) (0.162) (0.104)
Attractive -0.0233 -0.0167 0.0626 -0.0543
(0.0484) (0.0349) (0.150) (0.103)
Intelligent -0.00769 0.0907∗ -0.0209 0.00457
(0.0643) (0.0464) (0.109) (0.0762)
Trust 0.0731 -0.0185 -0.112 -0.0566
(0.0620) (0.0461) (0.177) (0.124)
Aggressive -0.0222 0.0160 0.134 -0.0259
(0.0469) (0.0378) (0.125) (0.0904)
Likely winner -0.0324 -0.0796 0.00836 -0.00525
(0.0754) (0.0568) (0.194) (0.129)
Observations 856 1634 116 267 856 1634 116 267
Notes: Using the average raw rating per advocate, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcome among male petitioners. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcome among male advocates. Columns 3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but among
female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but also control for other perceptual ratings.
Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
To further examine the robustness of these advocate-by-gender findings, we gradually add
MTurk rater controls and lawyer fixed effects in Tables XII and A.3. The inclusion of rater
characteristics in Columns 1–4 does not influence the estimated coefficients. Likewise, with the
addition of lawyer fixed effects, the coefficient estimates for male advocates are very similar
to those obtained in previous regressions using only within-advocate variation. That is, a one-
standard-deviation increase in perceived masculinity predicts a lower likelihood of winning.
However, the same does not hold for female advocates. In Columns 7 and 8, controlling
for rater characteristics and lawyer fixed effects, coefficient estimates for female advocates
are negative and decline significantly towards zero. This perhaps reflects the limited within-
advocate variation among female advocates in our sample.
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TABLE XII
Gender, Lawyer, and MTurker Rater Controls (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0144∗∗ -0.00963∗∗ 0.00991 0.0133∗ -0.00569∗∗ -0.00668∗∗∗ -0.00153 -0.000395
Feminine (0.00571) (0.00444) (0.0103) (0.00743) (0.00241) (0.00203) (0.00341) (0.00402)
Confident 0.00457 0.00379 -0.00950 0.00814 0.00314 0.00233 0.00365 0.00132
(0.00390) (0.00314) (0.0105) (0.00802) (0.00194) (0.00179) (0.00532) (0.00376)
Attractive -0.000428 -0.00137 0.00577 -0.00550 0.000228 0.00152 -0.00125 -0.00110
(0.00447) (0.00332) (0.0115) (0.00758) (0.00185) (0.00169) (0.00413) (0.00351)
Intelligent 0.00323 0.00662∗∗ -0.00669 -0.00799 0.00187 0.00201 0.00252 0.00354
(0.00390) (0.00298) (0.0127) (0.00954) (0.00177) (0.00157) (0.00418) (0.00421)
Trust 0.00279 -0.00221 -0.00737 0.00239 0.00105 0.000673 0.00570∗ 0.00521
(0.00351) (0.00267) (0.0105) (0.00686) (0.00189) (0.00156) (0.00326) (0.00350)
Aggressive -0.00156 0.00182 0.00711 0.00154 0.00174 0.000554 -0.00220 -0.00109
(0.00347) (0.00272) (0.0109) (0.00836) (0.00179) (0.00151) (0.00291) (0.00444)
Likely winner -0.000989 -0.00258 0.00514 0.00115 0.00172 0.00235 -0.00944∗∗∗ -0.00376
(0.00415) (0.00320) (0.0114) (0.00833) (0.00228) (0.00216) (0.00357) (0.00374)
MTurker controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lawyer FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18542 35329 2543 5868 18542 35329 2543 5868
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcome for male petitioners controlling for rater characteristics. Column 2 tests whether perceived
masculinity is associated with case outcome for male advocates controlling for rater characteristics. Columns
3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but among female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but
also control for lawyer fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
4.5 Discussion
Our results are robust to dropping lawyers with large caseloads; to a permutation (placebo)
test in which we randomly reassign voice ratings to another lawyer and verify null effects;
to day-of-week, seasonality, and year fixed effects; and to using the other subjects’ ratings as
instrumental variables. The focus on petitioners precludes case fixed effects, but a regression
with case fixed effects suggests that respondents may be imitating the petitioner to some
extent or simply have more noise. In Table XIII, we consider the potential role of the swing
voter. We report significant correlations at the outcome level (Column 1) but not at the judge
vote level (Column 2) or for the number of judge votes (Column 3). If the votes of swing
voters are associated with perceived masculinity in close cases (and the votes of judges are not
associated with perceived masculinity in easy cases), we would expect to find associations at
the case level rather than vote level. This result is consistent with heuristics or biases being
more likely to influence decisions in hard or close cases.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that documents an association between voice-
based impressionistic judgments and judicial decisions. To benchmark our findings, the 0.86
percentage-point difference in court outcomes attributed to a one-standard-deviation change
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TABLE XIII
Other Outcomes and Perceived Masculinity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Judge Votes for Lawyer # Votes for Lawyer Outcome
Masculine -0.0211** -0.00829 -0.0722 0.0523
(0.00928) (0.00676) (0.0605) (0.0793)
Number of Democrats 0.0215
(0.0380)
Masculine * -0.0249
  Number of Democrats (0.0237)
Other Ratings Y Y Y Y
Collapsed N N N Y
N 153545 150304 153545 3689
R-sq 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006
in our voice-based measure of perceived masculinity is equivalent to nearly one-quarter of the
gender gap (i.e., male lawyers are 3.7 percentage points more likely to win a court case than
female lawyers). When analyzed at the case level, one-standard-deviation change corresponds
to 5.2 percentage-point difference in court outcomes (when not including further controls).3
While the focus on language and gender in the courtroom is not new, previous studies have
focused primarily on the gendered language performance of witnesses (O’Barr and Atkins
1980) or the discursive practices in the courtroom (O’Barr 1982). We also build on a literature
using limited samples of Supreme Court oral arguments that finds, for example, Supreme
Court outcomes are correlated with authors’ coding of emotional arousal in the behavior of
Justices, lawyers, and their voices (Schubert et al. 1992); with the number of questions asked
by Justices (Epstein et al. 2010); and with measurements of the emotional content of questions
using linguistic dictionaries (Black et al. 2011). To the best of our knowledge, no studies have
focused on perceptions of the lawyers’ voices where lawyers are using identical words.
Masculinity is a quality or set of practices that is stereotypically, though not exclusively,
connected with men. Women may engage in masculine practices equally as often, although such
practices are usually either not noticed or censured. The performative nature of “masculinity”
makes possible the existence of non-masculine men and masculine women (Kiesling 2007;
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003; Butler 1990; Kessler and McKenna 1978). Different cultures
may also construct different notions of masculinity that are reflected in the stereotypical ways
of talking and thinking about men and masculinity. In the United States, there are four
main cultural discourses of masculinity (Kiesling 2007): gender difference, which pertains
to categorical difference in biology and behavior between men and women; heterosexism,
which sees being masculine as sexually desiring women and not men; dominance, which links
masculinity with notions of authority or power; and male solidarity, which assumes a given
bond among men.
32.79 divided by 0.54.
35
Sections 5-7 address the nature of the association between voice judgments and court out-
comes – i.e., why are court outcomes correlated with perceived masculinity but not other
attributes? Given that the attributes are positively correlated with each other, the fact that
only perceived masculinity is found to correlate with court outcomes suggests that masculinity
captures a particular variance that is not captured by the other ratings.
Our findings thus far do not allow us to conclude whether the Justices were engaging in a
form of linguistic profiling when making their judicial decisions nor whether law firms were
engaging in a form of linguistic profiling when choosing their oral advocates. However, we
will document that the associations are robust to controlling for pre-trial case characteristics,
lawyer characteristics, acoustic features, and the best prediction of Supreme Court votes based
on non-linear combinations of these characteristics, judge trends, and court trends.
Under complete markets, no extraneous factor should predict stock returns, since the mar-
ket should incorporate all information immediately. Similarly, no extraneous factor should
predict win rates, since the lawyers and law firms should adjust. Observing effects within
lawyer precludes fixed unobservable lawyer characteristics from driving the entire result. One
interpretation may be that even the highly skilled cannot conceal their tone – an unconscious
response to weak cases. Another is that macho men select hard cases – a conscious response to
weak cases. However, observing substantial judge heterogeneity precludes fixed unobservable
case characteristics from driving the entire result. The pattern of results for women precludes
judge constraints from driving the entire result. As we will see, Democrat votes correlate
more positively with less masculine-sounding males, while Republican votes correlate more
positively with feminine-sounding females.
5 Why Does Perceived Masculinity Predict SCOTUS Out-
comes?
There are at least four possible sources for why first impressions of lawyers’ voices predict U.S.
Supreme Court outcomes: lawyers, justices, firms, and clients. Lawyers perceived as masculine
may be different along relevant dimensions other than masculinity, and within-lawyer voice
masculinity may be a response to case weakness. Justices may be linguistically profiling, which
may be strategic, sincere, or homophily. Firms may be linguistically profiling in choosing their
oral advocates. The “perceived” or performative nature of masculinity may involve lawyers
performing for another audience or client. In Austen-Smith and Fryer’s (2005) ethnic identity
model, an individual has a "two-audience" signaling problem. Grogger (2011) adapted this
model to the linguistic choices of minorities, in which one audience is the labor market and
another is the peer group. In our context, one audience is the SCOTUS and another is the
firm. What we can do to investigate these hypotheses is to examine whether the coefficient on
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perceived masculinity is affected by observable lawyer controls and pre-trial controls, whether
masculinity ratings are correlated with votes by some judges but not others (and for some
industries but not others), and whose ratings of masculinity predict outcomes.
5.1 Are Lawyers Perceived as Masculine Different?
We confirmed the robustness of the association between perceived masculinity and court out-
comes in a study using a subsample of 30 cases (i.e., 60 male voice clips) argued in 2008 and
included in the analysis hand-collected lawyer covariates, such as age, number of clerkships,
whether the lawyer was a member of his school’s law review, and whether the lawyer grad-
uated from a top-5 law school. Our objective is to examine whether the connection between
perceptions of voices as masculine and real outcomes reflects other underlying characteristics
of advocates that may influence their success rates at the SCOTUS. We present the results
using the case-level data on these advocates in Table XIV. In Column 1, we show that the
negative correlation between Masculine and win probabilities continues to hold. In particu-
lar, with the addition of the full set of voice traits, the coefficient estimate on Masculine is
significantly larger than the ones we obtained in earlier regressions. Nonetheless, the results
are striking. In Column 3, we add the full set of advocate covariates we have managed to
obtain. These include a dummy for whether the advocate was previously a SCOTUS clerk,
the lawyer’s age, the number of clerkships the lawyer had, whether he was a member of the
law review, a dummy for whether he had an additional graduate degree, and whether he is a
graduate of Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, or the University of Chicago (‘Top-5’). The
coefficient on Masculine becomes further negative and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Thus, at least for this set of cases, it does not appear that the predictive power of
perceptions of masculinity is driven by advocate characteristics. Finally, in Column 4 we add
case fixed effects to explore whether the results on masculinity are relative (i.e., petitioner
relative to respondent). The estimates suggests that when using only within-case variation,
the correlation is further amplified. Since this difference does not appear in the 15-year sample
for the reasons described above, we do not explore it further.
Table XIV is unable to make far-reaching conclusions, given the small sample size. The
next two tables include all the other lawyer covariates described in the methodology section
(number of previous SCOTUS oral arguments, years since graduation, number of admitted
courts, number of practice areas, firm size, office size, being a law firm partner, and having
graduated from a top-5 law school), for the entire sample of lawyers with biographical data
on Westlaw or Lexis.4 About 50% of the lawyers could be located (missing lawyers’ data was
dummied out). The perceived masculinity correlation is highly robust (Table XV). Column
1 begins at the micro level without lawyer controls, Column 2 adds masculinity of name,
4The biographical pages were manually saved by research assistants, then a computer code digitized the
hand-collected files.
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TABLE XIV
Perceptions of Voice and Lawyer Characteristics (normalized ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Masculine -0.197 -0.434** -0.719*** -1.203*
(0.140) (0.200) (0.206) (0.618)
Attractive 0.111 0.281 0.384
(0.221) (0.294) (0.850)
Confident 0.167 0.277 0.545
(0.253) (0.202) (0.554)
Trustworthy 0.285 0.279 0.559
(0.288) (0.317) (1.419)
SCOTUS clerk -0.0257 0.134
(0.227) (0.817)
Lawyer’s age 0.0121* 0.0203
(0.00646) (0.0261)
Number of clerkships -0.114 -0.182
(0.116) (0.465)
Law review 0.415*** 0.815**
(0.131) (0.363)
Other graduate degree 0.115 -0.00364
(0.158) (0.499)
Top-5 law school 0.0687 0.0956
(0.153) (0.397)
Case fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 58 58 58 58
R-squared 0.037 0.096 0.258 0.411
Notes: Using the average normalized rating per advocate, Columns 1-4 test whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcomes while controlling for an increasing number of advocate characteristics.
Columns 1-2 repeat the prior analyses for the subset of advocates for which we have data on age, number of
clerkships, law school, graduate degrees, and having served on law review or as a Supreme Court clerk.
Column 3 includes these characteristics as controls. Column 4 includes case fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Column 3 adds SCOTUS experience, and Column 4 includes all covariates. The coefficient
magnitude is highly stable. In Column 5, we examine the relationship at the case level, where
the coefficient is still significant at p < 0.05. Notably, the relationship remains specific to
perceived masculinity. If perceptions of masculinity were simply reflecting other important
advocate covariates, then the coefficient estimates on Masculine should be driven to zero.
That this is not the case suggests that the channel of how trait judgments stemming from an
extremely brief voice clip predict outcomes may not be as simple as one might expect. We
do not have data on body size, but researchers articulate no robust association between voice
pitch and body size (Fitch 1997; Künzel 1989).
Table XVI presents the analogous study for female lawyers. The point estimates remain
similar across Columns 1-4, but become statistically less significant. Notably, feminine voices
are perceived as more attractive (Puts et al. 2011; Feinberg et al. 2005), but we have controlled
for attractiveness and its association is far smaller and less significant than for femininity.
5.2 Is Voice Masculinity a Response to Case Weakness?
Are pre-trial characteristics correlated with perceived masculinity? Using the Supreme Court
Database5, we find that perceived masculinity still predicts outcomes after controlling for all
available pre-trial data in the database, which is described in the Methodology section. Column
1 of Table XVII presents the analysis without additional controls. Column 2 adds whether the
lower court had a dissent, was reversing the trial court decision, or made a liberal decision. Note
that lower-court dissent is positively associated with the petitioner winning, which is noted
in the large literature on the role of judicial dissents. Yet the association is only eight times
larger than the association for perceived masculinity unit change. Since the standard deviation
of the raw masculinity ratings was 1.5, this means the association with lower-court dissent
is 5.5 times larger than the association with one-standard-deviation decrease in perceived
masculinity. Column 3 adds the number of words in the lower-court opinion, the number of
self-certainty words, whether the lower court had both Democrats and Republicans on the
three-judge panel, along with fixed effects for the Circuit and the legal topic. This restricts
the sample to cases with non-missing data that came from the Circuit Courts (the remainder
would come from state courts). Political division in the lower court is associated with a win by
the petitioner, which is consistent with theoretical models of judicial decision-making (Beim
et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2015), and the magnitude of the coefficient on masculinity becomes
slightly larger relative to Column 2. Columns 3–6 include lawyer fixed effects. As before, the
association between perceived masculinity and case outcomes is smaller. Notably, the presence
of a lower-court dissent no longer predicts a ruling in favor of the petitioner, while the political
division of the lower court panel does. We will return to pre-trial characteristics in Section 7,
5http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php
39
Table
X
V
:C
ase
O
utcom
es
and
P
erceived
M
asculinity
M
asculine
-0.0149***
-0.0145***
-0.0151***
-0.0139***
-0.0864**
(0.00565)
(0.00559)
(0.00558)
(0.00537)
(0.0340)
C
onfident
0.00508
0.00535
0.00595
0.00482
0.0851
(0.00387)
(0.00386)
(0.00385)
(0.00382)
(0.0539)
A
ttractive
0.0000377
-0.000927
-0.000399
0.000460
-0.00237
(0.00445)
(0.00445)
(0.00441)
(0.00431)
(0.0501)
Intelligent
0.00244
0.00264
0.00309
0.00166
-0.0167
(0.00385)
(0.00384)
(0.00381)
(0.00375)
(0.0639)
T
rust
0.00356
0.00336
0.00330
0.00305
0.0644
(0.00344)
(0.00343)
(0.00345)
(0.00338)
(0.0618)
A
ggressive
-0.00134
-0.00139
-0.00145
-0.00170
-0.0235
(0.00345)
(0.00343)
(0.00343)
(0.00339)
(0.0472)
L
ikely w
inner
-0.000977
-0.00118
-0.000821
-0.00152
-0.0401
(0.00411)
(0.00411)
(0.00412)
(0.00405)
(0.0755)
M
asculinity of N
am
e
N
Y
Y
N
N
SC
O
T
U
S Experience
N
N
Y
N
N
A
dditional Law
yer C
ovariates
N
N
N
Y
Y
C
ollapsed
N
N
N
N
Y
O
bservations
18542
18542
18542
18542
856
R
-squared
0.002
0.006
0.008
0.018
0.026
Sam
ple: M
ale Petitioners
D
ependent V
ariable: C
ase O
utcom
e (w
in =
 1, lose =
 0)
40
Ta
bl
e
X
V
I:
C
as
e
O
ut
co
m
es
an
d
P
er
ce
iv
ed
Fe
m
in
in
ity
Fe
m
in
in
e
0.
01
25
*
0.
01
35
**
0.
01
04
0.
00
89
0
0.
15
1
(0
.0
06
78
)
(0
.0
06
68
)
(0
.0
06
47
)
(0
.0
06
47
)
(0
.1
17
)
C
on
fid
en
t
0.
00
70
1
0.
00
91
0
0.
00
69
0
0.
00
40
2
0.
02
39
(0
.0
07
30
)
(0
.0
07
24
)
(0
.0
07
14
)
(0
.0
06
89
)
(0
.1
04
)
A
tt
ra
ct
iv
e
-0
.0
05
87
-0
.0
06
45
-0
.0
05
08
-0
.0
04
12
-0
.0
53
7
(0
.0
07
43
)
(0
.0
07
28
)
(0
.0
07
15
)
(0
.0
06
73
)
(0
.1
03
)
In
te
lli
ge
nt
-0
.0
05
78
-0
.0
07
16
-0
.0
04
08
-0
.0
01
22
0.
01
62
(0
.0
08
47
)
(0
.0
08
52
)
(0
.0
08
38
)
(0
.0
07
97
)
(0
.0
75
6)
T
ru
st
-0
.0
01
75
-0
.0
02
66
-0
.0
01
40
-0
.0
00
92
0
-0
.0
53
6
(0
.0
06
47
)
(0
.0
06
41
)
(0
.0
06
29
)
(0
.0
06
07
)
(0
.1
24
)
A
gg
re
ss
iv
e
0.
00
24
3
0.
00
07
63
-0
.0
01
82
-0
.0
01
12
-0
.0
52
4
(0
.0
07
86
)
(0
.0
07
74
)
(0
.0
07
71
)
(0
.0
07
58
)
(0
.0
95
5)
L
ik
el
y 
w
in
ne
r
0.
00
36
1
0.
00
29
4
0.
00
08
82
0.
00
29
6
0.
00
76
8
(0
.0
07
85
)
(0
.0
07
81
)
(0
.0
07
58
)
(0
.0
07
46
)
(0
.1
29
)
M
as
cu
lin
ity
 o
f N
am
e
N
Y
Y
N
N
SC
O
T
U
S 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
N
N
Y
N
N
A
dd
iti
on
al
 L
aw
ye
r 
C
ov
ar
ia
te
s
N
N
N
Y
Y
C
ol
la
ps
ed
N
N
N
N
Y
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
58
68
58
68
58
68
58
68
26
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
4
0.
02
3
0.
03
9
0.
07
9
0.
08
8
Sa
m
pl
e:
 F
em
al
e 
La
w
ye
rs
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
 C
as
e 
O
ut
co
m
e 
(w
in
 =
 1
, l
os
e 
=
 0
)
41
TABLE XVII
Pre-Trial Characteristics and Case Outcomes
Masculine -0.0153*** -0.0125** -0.0166** -0.00546** -0.00554** -0.00389*
(0.00576) (0.00576) (0.00756) (0.00225) (0.00228) (0.00235)
Aggressive -0.000563 0.0000108 0.00181 0.00228 0.00263 0.00217
(0.00352) (0.00350) (0.00424) (0.00173) (0.00175) (0.00164)
Attractive 0.00189 -0.000299 0.00189 0.00202 0.00172 0.00101
(0.00454) (0.00443) (0.00570) (0.00179) (0.00172) (0.00191)
Confident 0.00554 0.00390 0.00199 0.00284 0.00258 -0.00221
(0.00396) (0.00384) (0.00461) (0.00191) (0.00196) (0.00192)
Intelligent 0.00250 0.00260 0.00191 0.000816 0.000983 0.00250
(0.00391) (0.00389) (0.00536) (0.00175) (0.00178) (0.00179)
Trust 0.00391 0.00560 0.00421 0.00232 0.00242 0.000647
(0.00352) (0.00345) (0.00428) (0.00179) (0.00178) (0.00172)
Likely winner -0.00194 -0.00230 -0.00435 0.000736 0.000825 0.000916
(0.00421) (0.00426) (0.00518) (0.00219) (0.00225) (0.00204)
Lower Court Disagreement 0.107*** 0.142*** 0.0323 -0.0659
(0.0366) (0.0518) (0.0537) (0.0786)
Lower Court Reversing -0.0218 -0.00438 -0.0909* -0.0964
  Trial Court (0.0385) (0.0483) (0.0543) (0.0703)
Lower Court Liberal 0.0750** 0.0406 0.0155 0.0127
  Decision (0.0355) (0.0471) (0.0592) (0.0771)
Lower Court Opinion -0.00612 0.0203
  Word Count (0.0134) (0.0256)
Lower Court Opinion -0.00130 -0.647
  Self-Certainty Words (0.402) (0.710)
Lower Court Politically 0.0977* 0.139*
  Divided (0.0559) (0.0801)
Circuit and topic fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Lawyer fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17782 17358 9542 17782 17358 9542
Sample: Male Petitioners
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
which considers the previous best existing prediction models of Supreme Court votes. These
models incorporate trends at the Justice, Supreme Court, and lower-court levels.
5.3 Do Judges Differ in How Their Votes Correlate with Masculine
Voices?
Votes of Democrats, but not Republicans, are negatively associated with perceived masculin-
ity (Figure 2). In the higher intercept for Republicans, we see that Republicans favor males,
as documented previously by Szmer et al. (2010). The slope on the left side indicates that
Democrats disfavor masculine males relative to less-masculine males – and the lack of a gra-
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TABLE XVIII
Political Party and Response to Male Petitioner Masculinity (p < 0.01)
(1)
Judge Votes for Lawyer
Masculinity -0.000460
(0.00806)
Female Judge -0.00554
(0.0194)
Masculinity * Female Judge -0.00236
(0.00266)
Democrat -0.0426*
(0.0246)
Masculinity * Democrat Judge -0.0203***
(0.00756)
Other Ratings Y
Cluster Lawyer and Judge
N 150304
R-sq 0.003
dient for Republicans indicates that the adverse outcome for masculine males can be entirely
attributed to Democratic votes. All analyses in this sub-section regress:
(1) judge votes for advocateitwj = α + attribute′itwjβ + x
′
itwjγ + εitwj,
where w subscripts for rater and j for judge. Standard errors are clustered at the lawyer
and judge levels, and judge fixed effects are included. Interactions between attribute′itwj and
indicators for whether the judge is a Democrat or Female are included in some models. In
the remainder of Section 5, we alternatively consider interactions with case, firm, and rater
characteristics.
The heterogeneity along the dimension of judges’ politics is not due to their gender. When
both are included as interaction terms, only the interaction between perceived masculinity and
political party is statistically significant (Table XVIII). Nor are experience and age driving
factors. Although only 13 individuals serve as Supreme Court Justices during our time frame,
the differences between judges based on party affiliation are highly significant (p < 0.01).
If we fully interact gender and party, we see a slight gender effect (Figure 11). This is largely
due to Sandra Day O’Connor, whose reaction to perceived masculinity exists relative to her
male Republican colleagues, but is far more muted than how her female Democratic and male
Democratic colleagues react.
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Figure 11: Political Party and Response to Male Petitioner Masculinity (p < 0.01)
Graph 1/31/16, 6:21 PM
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If we replace party with judges’ ideology scores (Martin and Quinn 2002) or include both
together, we find that ideology (p < 0.01) is more important than party, which is rendered
insignificant (Figure 12).
Figure 13 considers judge heterogeneity for within-lawyer variation and for lawyers who
appeared only once in the Supreme Court. When we include lawyer fixed effects on the left
side of Figure 13, it suggests that something other than judges’ ideology would need to explain
within-lawyer effects. Notably, the right-hand side indicates that the judicial heterogeneity for
between-lawyer effects when restricted to lawyers who argued only once is quite strong, so
the between-lawyer variance for non-repeat advocates may have been masked in the analysis
looking at court outcomes only.
We also find that Republicans vote for feminine-sounding females more than Democrats do
(Figure 14). The difference is significant at p < 0.1. Notably, this rules out an explanation
in which Republican judges have “made up their minds” regardless of the lawyer and only
Democrats pick up on case weakness correlated with more masculine male voices. For an
explanation of case weakness as an omitted variable, one would need Democrats to notice
this more for males and Republicans to notice this more for females, which is a somewhat
more complicated hypothesis than one in which firms and clients perceive masculine voices as
winning voices and select them at the risk of losing in the court.
This result is again not affected by the judge’s gender, in a specification including in-
teractions with gender and party. Fully interacting gender and party indicates that among
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Figure 12: Judicial Ideology and Response to Male Petitioner Masculinity (p < 0.01)
Graph 1/31/16, 7:03 PM
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Figure 13: Political Party and Response to Male Petitioner Masculinity (Within and Between
Lawyers)
Graph 1/30/16, 4:34 PM
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Figure 14: Political Party and Response to Femininity (p < 0.1)
Democrats, males respond slightly more favorably to feminine females, while among Republi-
cans, Sandra Day O’Connor responds more favorably to feminine females (Figure 15). Among
females, the Republican (Sandra Day O’Connor) significantly responds more favorably to
feminine females than her female Democratic counterparts. The ideological difference is more
muted for males.
5.4 Why are Votes of Judges Correlating Differentially with Mascu-
line Voices?
There are at least three possible reasons why judges vote differently to perceived masculinity.
We consider these three reasons in turn: strategic voting, sincere voting, and homophily.
H0: With strategic voting, judges could vote to signal their attitudes towards gender role
issues. Democrats want to signal they are progressive and support gender-neutral sounding
men. Republicans want to signal their support for traditional values and gender roles: females
should sound female, and men and women should have a distinct role. Under strategic voting,
we should see no variation across cases.
H1: With sincere voting, judges value information more highly from advocates who sound
less masculine, since they must be more highly skilled than their more masculine-sounding
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Figure 15: Political Party and Response to Femininity (p < 0.01)
Graph 2/1/16, 1:12 PM
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colleagues in order to have reached this level. For both men and women this means not
sounding masculine. Under sincere voting, we should see this effect particularly in difficult or
technical cases.
H2: With homophily, voices perceived as masculine may signal ideology and engender trust.
Labor, consumer, and civil rights advocacy groups have traditionally sought to put forth
attorneys who share their ideology. Recent studies find that Republican women in Congress
look feminine ( Carpinella and Johnson 2013) and Republican Senators look “powerful” while
Democrats look “warm” (Rule and Ambady 2010), which are potential synonyms for more and
less masculine. Under homophily, we should see this effect particularly in ideological cases.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the scope of the data precludes identifying
the exact reason. For instance, we are unable to distinguish behavior that is intentional vs.
unintentional or due to signaling vs. preference. Nevertheless, we use the data that we have
on cases to explore these three broad classes of reasons.
Examining the raw correlation between Democratic votes and male petitioners in different
case categories (Figure 16) shows that the correlation is more salient in the case categories
of: attorneys, interstate relations, and federal taxation (p < 0.05) (also federalism). With the
exception of the last category, these are less ideological areas according to their ranking in
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Figure 16: Substantial Variation by Case, Stronger in Less-Ideological Cases
Graph 2/23/16, 5:05 PM
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percent of decisions with 5-4 outcomes.6
Comparing with Republican vote patterns by case type (Figure 17), we see that both
Democrats and Republicans vote for less-masculine lawyers in federal taxation (p < 0.1),
interstate relations, federalism, and attorneys cases, which would be consistent with sincere
voting. However, the slope differs in ideological cases like unions and civil rights, which is
consistent with homophily.
Using a dummy indicator for the less-ideological case categories, we regress:
(2)
judge votes for advocateitw = α +masc
′
itwβ0 +masc
′
itw ∗Demwβ1
+masc′itw ∗ LessIdeotβ2 + x′itwγ + εitw
The results suggest that the overall effect can be broken down into ideology for 75% (H2) of
the effect, and information for the remaining 25% (H1). The reason is that despite the visual
agreement in the previous figures, there are actually very few tax and attorney cases. This
breakdown needs to be viewed as an approximation and it is unlikely that only one of the
three hypotheses explains the entirety of the judicial heterogeneity. Inconsistent with strategic
voting is the fact that Republicans do not favor masculine-sounding males. Inconsistent with
6We observe that 5-4 decisions occur with the following frequency in these legal areas: unions - 34%, criminal
procedure - 31%, federalism - 28%, civil rights - 27%, first amendment - 26%, judicial power - 22%, interstate
relations - 22%, due process - 21%, privacy - 21%, attorneys - 21%, economic activity - 12%, and federal
taxation - 10%.
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Figure 17: Even Republicans Vote like Democrats in Less-Ideological Cases
Graph 2/23/16, 5:06 PM
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sincere voting is the fact that Republicans appear not to value this information unless it comes
from a female. Inconsistent with homophily is the fact that it would not explain within-lawyer
effects, unless the within-lawyer change in voice corresponds to changes in ideology.
Indeed, we can see a somewhat similar pattern for female lawyers: agreement in less-
ideological cases that feminine-sounding females win the votes of both Democrats and Re-
publicans, and disagreement in more-ideological cases. Figure 18 presents Republican votes
for female advocates by case category. (The smaller number of females entails the omission
of one category.) Attorneys (p < 0.01) (also federalism, federal taxation, due process, and
privacy) cases see a more marked Republican gradient.
For Democrats, we also see attorneys (p < 0.05) (also federal taxation) cases having positive
gradients (Figure 19).
Regardless of the source of the judicial heterogeneity, lawyers should adjust their voices
unless another audience matters, which we explore in the next two sub-sections.
5.5 Is Masculinity of Voice Differentially Correlated with Court Out-
comes across Firms?
Thus far, we have observed that masculine-sounding males lose in the Supreme Court,
which does not seem to be due to omitted variables at the lawyer or pre-trial level. Part of
masculine males losing seems due to a combination of identity and ideology (Democrats but not
Republicans vote in favor of less-masculine males) and partly by information (less-masculine
males win both Democrat and Republican votes in the less-ideological, more technical areas
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Figure 18: Substantial Variation by Case, Stronger in Less-Ideological Cases
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Figure 19: Even Democrats Vote like Republicans in Less-Ideological Cases (p < 0.05)
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TABLE XIX
Public vs. Private Firms and Response to Masculinity
Masculine Rating
Public -0.0480*
(0.0287)
Observations 1580
of law, which is consistent with firms choosing lawyers who sound more masculine at the
risk of losing cases). We now address the role of firm selection more directly using data on
firm characteristics and rater characteristics. In the model, industries that value d > 0 more
highly, with a greater relative taste for M lawyers than for F lawyers, the price of masculinity
increases: they will choose more masculine-sounding lawyers with the consequence of losing
more often.
We begin by simply dividing the set of firms into two categories: not-for-profit (e.g., gov-
ernment) vs. private. Prior research finds that, in the private sector, CEOs with deeper voices
manage larger companies (Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012), which may lead private firms to
prefer masculine-sounding lawyers. Indeed, not-for-profit firms’ lawyers are slightly less mas-
culine than private firm lawyers (p < 0.1) (Table XIX). We also observe stronger negative
correlations between perceived masculinity and court outcomes among private firms and in
industries with more masculine voices (p < 0.05) (Figure 20), and essentially no correlation
between perceived masculinity and win rates for public lawyers advocating on behalf of the
government, which renders less likely an explanation based solely on Justices ideologically
profiling lawyers.
To be more systematic, we next construct an average masculinity rating for every class of
petitioners. Perceived masculinity is negatively correlated with outcomes for industries that
have the most masculine-sounding lawyers. Figure 20 presents a gradient for four industry
quartiles according to masculinity. The steepest gradient is for the most masculine and the
flattest for the least masculine, which is consistent with differences in d > 0. The most repre-
sented petitioner categories in the highest quartile of masculine voices are: penal institutions,
telecommunications, and drug manufacturers. The most represented petitioner categories in
the lowest quartile of masculine industries are: United States, city or municipality, and em-
ployee or job applicant.
5.6 Whose Perceptions of Masculinity Predict Outcomes?
Regardless of the reason for judges to vote differently according to voice masculinity, lawyers
should adjust, unless another audience matters. We now investigate two issues regarding
whether perceptions of voice might differ by rater characteristic. First, do certain individuals’
perceptions of masculinity (possibly those of law firm employers) predict court outcomes?
Second, do certain individuals (possibly law firm employers) perceive masculine voices to be
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Figure 20: Masculinity of Industry and Response to Masculinity (p < 0.05)
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more likely to win? Affirmative answers to the two questions on rater heterogeneity would
suggest that law firm employers are the true audience for the lawyers’ masculinity.
We begin by analyzing the raters’ gender in order to match priors. Previous studies find
that members of the same sex may use certain criteria to rate each other, which differ from
those used to rate members of the opposite sex (Babel et al. 2014). Table A.5 shows that
partial correlations among perceived attributes of men and women differ when rated by men
or by women. We then investigate other demographic characteristics that play a bigger role
than gender.
The associations stem more (but not significantly more) from the judgments made by male
participants rating male lawyers and female participants rating female lawyers (Figure 21).
Tables XX and A.6 show that the patterns discussed thus far are somewhat accentuated
when the genders of the rater and advocate match. Male ratings of the masculinity (femi-
ninity) of male (female) advocates’ voices are significantly negatively correlated with whether
the male advocate wins, while female ratings of the femininity of female advocates’ voices
are positively correlated with whether the female advocate wins.7 Among petitioners, a one-
standard-deviation increase in perceived masculinity measured using male perceptions predicts
a 2.3 percentage-point lower likelihood of winning the case if the advocate is male. Using female
perceptions, a similar change in perceived femininity predicts a 3.2 percentage-point higher
7 The average of Column 1 and Column 5 of Table A.6 is Column 5 in Table A.2 (that is, the data used is
pooled but the model remains the same: no MTurk controls and no lawyer fixed effects).
52
Figure 21: Voice-Based Perceptions and Court Outcomes by Advocate and Participant Gender
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Notes: Binned scatterplots illustrating the association between voice-based masculinity (femininity) rating
and court outcomes when lawyer voices are rated separately by same-sex and cross-sex participants. The
figures reflect the models presented in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table A.6.
likelihood of winning the case if the advocate is female. These associations are displayed in
Figure 9. The results for unmatched gender specification have substantially smaller coefficient
estimates and are less statistically distinguishable from 0, which can be seen in Figure 21.
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TABLE XX
Voice Perceptions and Gender Match (raw ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male MTurk Workers Female MTurk Workers
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0156∗∗ -0.0122∗∗ 0.00332 0.00958 -0.0130∗∗ -0.00704 0.0200 0.0146∗
Feminine (0.00629) (0.00486) (0.0131) (0.00934) (0.00648) (0.00496) (0.0121) (0.00809)
Confident 0.00477 0.00465 -0.0112 0.00514 0.00513 0.00340 -0.00579 0.00861
(0.00512) (0.00394) (0.0153) (0.00973) (0.00500) (0.00391) (0.0106) (0.00807)
Attractive 0.00564 0.00302 0.00872 -0.00561 -0.00493 -0.00445 -0.00153 -0.00597
(0.00515) (0.00385) (0.0152) (0.0109) (0.00559) (0.00421) (0.0126) (0.00858)
Intelligent 0.00797 0.00843∗∗ -0.0128 -0.00789 -0.00354 0.00345 0.00785 -0.00390
(0.00490) (0.00377) (0.00985) (0.00895) (0.00530) (0.00397) (0.0156) (0.0107)
Trust 0.000508 -0.00396 0.00345 0.00306 0.00696 0.000976 -0.0120 -0.00494
(0.00478) (0.00366) (0.0153) (0.00961) (0.00491) (0.00364) (0.0141) (0.00936)
Aggressive -0.00156 -0.000222 0.00797 -0.000861 -0.00111 0.00411 0.00356 0.00435
(0.00457) (0.00351) (0.0156) (0.0112) (0.00424) (0.00333) (0.0103) (0.00794)
Likely winner -0.000237 0.000112 -0.00109 0.000111 -0.00184 -0.00559 0.00496 0.00579
(0.00545) (0.00411) (0.0158) (0.0111) (0.00554) (0.00442) (0.0127) (0.00931)
Observations 9179 17435 1198 2714 9363 17894 1345 3154
Notes: Using the raw perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcomes for male petitioners rated by male raters. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcomes for male advocates rated by male raters. Columns 3-4 do the same as
Columns 1-2 but for female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but for ratings by female
raters. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Next, we observe even greater heterogeneity according to the rater’s race and region (Figures
22 and 23). White (p < 0.05) and non-Southerners’ (p < 0.05) perceptions of masculinity are
more significantly predictive of court outcomes than other demographic groups’ perceptions.
We constructed five dummy indicators for MTurk rater demographics and two of the five are
significant at the 5% level. The five dummies are indicators for male (49% of the sample),
poor (less than US$20,000 income per year) (20% of the sample), White (74% of the sample),
at-most high school education (11% of the sample), and being from the U.S. South (30%
of the sample). We did not construct or test any other dummy indicators or interactions of
indicators.
If White non-Southerners are more involved in the process of selecting oral advocates, the
stronger correlations would be consistent with the important role of the firm in explaining the
negative correlation between masculinity and court outcomes.
Interestingly, White and non-Southerners’ perceptions of femininity are also more predictive
of court outcomes, though the difference is less salient than for masculinity (Figure 24).
When we examine raters’ perceptions of winning and masculinity, we see that poor individ-
uals (p < 0.05) and non-whites (p < 0.05) are significantly less likely to correlate masculinity
54
Figure 22: White Raters’ Perceptions of Masculinity Predicted Court Outcomes (p < 0.05)
Figure 23: Non-Southerners’ Perceptions of Masculinity Predicted Court Outcomes (p < 0.05)
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Figure 24: White non-Southerners’ Perceptions of Femininity also Predict Court Outcomes
(p > 0.1)
with winning. Poor individuals (p < 0.05), males (p < 0.1), and the less-educated (p < 0.05),
are significantly less likely to correlate femininity with winning. This is notable for three
reasons. First, if these individuals are more likely to comprise the Democratic Party, the
findings are consistent with judicial heterogeneity. Second, if these individuals are less likely
to be selecting oral advocates, the results are consistent with the role of firms in selecting
masculine-sounding males as Supreme Court oral advocates. It also suggests that more diver-
sity in the set of firm selectors can be financially profitable for the firm. Third, perceptions
of masculinity are subjective and not everyone perceives the same voice as being masculine.
Different stereotypes persist, which may drive behavioral responses. In the next section, we
ask whether individuals can be de-biased.
6 De-biasing Experiment
6.1 What are Lawyers Doing Over Time?
Voice appears to be mutable, and perceived masculinity is negatively correlated with winning
in the Supreme Court. We begin by exploring whether lawyers are learning over time to make
their voice less masculine. On the contrary, lawyers’ perceived masculinity increase over time as
they appear before the SCOTUS more often. This is surprising since it would seem to suggest
that lawyers are not learning and instead, adapt their voice in the opposite direction. Figure
25 visualizes how individual lawyers become more masculine over time. The left side presents
the raw correlation, residualizing only on lawyer fixed effects. The right side also controls
for years since law school graduation. Figure 26 presents the cross-sectional variation without
lawyer fixed effects. Note that more-experienced lawyers generally have a less-masculine voice,
so the within-lawyer analysis (which biases towards selecting lawyers who repeatedly win) will
be biased towards finding less-masculine voices. In fact, we find the opposite.
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Figure 25: Masculine Ratings and Order of Appearance
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Notes: Within-lawyer graph is residualized on lawyer fixed effects, so negative means early years of
experienced advocates.
Figure 26: Cross-sectional variation
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TABLE XXI
Are Lawyers Learning?
Outcome Masculinity Rating ΔMasculinity Rating
Masculinity Rating -0.0605**
(0.0308)
Previous Loss 0.0445 -0.0463
(0.0551) (0.0359)
Collapsed Y Y Y
Observations 862 389 389
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.004
Sample: Male Petitioners
Table XXI rejects the hypothesis that losses are significantly associated with decreases in
perceived masculinity. Column 1 repeats the negative association between masculinity rating
and court outcome. Column 2 presents the correlation between a loss in the previous Supreme
Court appearance and the masculinity rating in the current Supreme Court appearance. The
positive association means a significant rejection of learning/modifying one’s voice to be less
masculine in response to a loss. Column 3 presents the correlation between a previous loss and
a change in the masculinity rating from the previous appearance to the current appearance. It
is negative, but not significantly so. The contrast between Columns 2 and 3 is consistent with
the selection for masculinity, among lawyers who appear repeatedly at the Supreme Court,
which biases upwards the correlation in levels. Whatever drives the increase in perceived
masculinity (it may be “covering” to make one sound more masculine in order to be hired
again), lawyers do not seem to be taking actual win rates into account.
6.2 Information and Incentives
We now turn to our de-biasing experiment. Let yij represent attitudes in treatment j = 1, 2, 3, 4
and recording i, Fj be an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if raters receive information
about whether the attorney on the recording won the case or not, and 0 otherwise. Ij indicates
whether the raters where given an incentive to choose correctly (Ij = 1) or not (Ij = 0).
The estimation equation takes the following form:
yij = α + βVi + γ
′TJ + δ′TJ × Vi + eij,
where Vi ∈ {H,L} is advocate i ’s voice type and TJ ∈ {[Fj] , [Ij]} is a treatment vector (2x2
treatment). The incentives treatment entailed an additional $0.5 for raters who get two-thirds
or more of the outcomes correct.
Figure 4 shows that information reduces 40% of the correlation between perceived mas-
culinity and perceived win (p < 0.05). In fact, all ratings’ positive correlations with perceived
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Figure 27: Incentives (p < 0.05) with Feedback
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wins are affected by information but not incentives. Recall that none of the other ratings pre-
dicted actual wins, but raters generally associated all the attributes with a greater likelihood
of winning.
When we fully interact the treatments in Figure 27, we observe that incentives further reduce
the correlation. Recall that incentives to choose correctly erode the effect of taste on choices
(piF −piM > dα). Providing incentives should bring d→ 0. The existence of the effect (p < 0.05,
30% of association with feedback) also means d > 0 (else d
α
would be 0 regardless of the size
of α).
7 Explanation of Variance
7.1 How Does Predictive Power Compare with Previous Best Mul-
tivariate Models?
We consider predictions using random forest tree methods (Katz et al. 2014; Guimerà and
Sales-Pardo 2011; Ruger et al. 2004; Martin et al. 2004). The latest model correctly identifies
70% of the Court’s overall affirm / reverse decisions and 71% of the votes of individual justices
from 1953–2013. It uses pre-trial characteristics (which collectively received roughly 25% of
the importance weight) as well as court and judge historical trends specific to issue, parties,
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and lower courts (which collectively received roughly 75% of the importance weight). Feature
weights are presented in Table XXII, which comes from Katz et al. (2014).
We use this prediction of Justices’ votes. Intuitively, if the predictive model were perfect, i.e.,
we essentially control for the correct decision or true case quality, then no extraneous factors
should matter. Does perceived masculinity have an explanatory effect above and beyond this
best predictor? If so, how much R-square improvement?
Table XXIII shows that the predicted vote correlates strongly with the actual judge vote (p <
0.01) in Column 1. Column 2 examines the separate role of perceived masculinity (p < 0.05).
Column 3 includes both, where both coefficients and standard errors are essentially unchanged
from Columns 1 and 2. Two results emerge. First, perceived masculinity is orthogonal to
observable pre-trial case characteristics, as seen in Section 5, and also orthogonal to court and
judge trends. Second, the R-square increases from 0.061 in Column 1 to 0.063 in Column 3,
meaning that an additional 3% of variance can be explained. At the case level in Columns
4–6, an additional 10% of variance is explained, and the coefficient on perceived masculinity
becomes substantially larger, about one-third the size of the correlation with the predicted
vote.
Why does perceived masculinity do so well relative to the best prediction model? Notably,
Katz et al. (2014) state that their model performs best on cases on which the Court was in
agreement (9-0) and performs worst on cases with high levels of disagreement among members
of the Court (5-4). In fact, in close cases affirming the lower court, the model predicts the
outcome with only 25% accuracy.8 We showed earlier in the paper that perceived masculinity
is found to be relevant with the swing voter, which is where the random forest model may do
poorly.
7.2 How Much Do Perceptions Explain beyond Objective Acoustic
Data?
We now analyze acoustic features of the clips using a set of phonetic traits previously deemed as
important by the phonology literature: (1) formant frequencies (F1, F2) for ve stressed vowels
(/i, I, O, ej, 2/); (2) formant dispersion (average vowel distance from a central point per talker
per sound clip); (3) spectral tilt (H1-H2, H1-A1, H1-A2, H1-A3); (4) sibilant’s duration, four
spectral moments, and peak frequency; (5) speaking rate (phonemes per second); (6) rhythm
(Pairwise Variability Index); (7) F0 mean and standard deviation. Some analysis documenting
the measurements of these traits in the Supreme Court oral arguments is provided elsewhere
(Yu et al. 2015). Note that some of these capture pitch range, which is hypothesized to be
correlated with ideology (Reeve 2015).
Table XXIV presents our findings. Columns 1 and 2 present the association with perceived
masculinity alone and with the additional perceptual variables. Column 3 adds all the acoustic
8Figure 6 in Katz et al.
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TABLE XXII
Final Feature Weights (Katz et al. 2014)
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TABLE XXIII
Best Prediction and Perceived Masculinity
Predicted Vote 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.250*** 0.248***
  from Random Forest (0.0486) (0.0487) (0.0485) (0.0489)
Masculine -0.0223** -0.0207** -0.0852** -0.0780**
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0359) (0.0361)
Cluster
Collapsed No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26447 26391 26391 1229 1229 1229
R-squared 0.061 0.002 0.063 0.058 0.008 0.064
Sample: Male Petitioners, Democrat Judges
Judge Votes for Lawyer
Lawyer and Judge
controls. The association with perceived masculinity is basically invariant for two reasons.
First, perceived masculinity is correlated with many acoustic variables (Puts et al. 2011). While
masculinity is correlated with the attributes we measure, like pitch, the same attributes are
also correlated with many of the other perceptions (like confidence) that were not significantly
associated with case outcomes. Second, human perceptions matter beyond objective data:
people can detect attributes and characteristics that computers cannot (White et al. 2015;
Adler and Schuckers 2007).
8 Conclusion
Mutable characteristics are relevant to current policy debates in the United States and the
EU. While economic theorists have modeled such characteristics, mutable characteristics have
received less attention in the empirical literature (Bertrand and Duflo 2016).
We find that snap judgments of advocate voices predict SCOTUS outcomes based on per-
ceived masculinity. Males who are perceived as less masculine are more likely to win. The
petitioner (the first lawyer to argue) is the main driver. Among repeat petitioners, 30% of the
variance can be explained by within-male-lawyer differences, and 70% by between-male-lawyer
variation. As for why voices predict SCOTUS outcomes, we find that Democratic judges prefer
less-masculine-sounding males and Republican judges prefer more-feminine-sounding females,
and that there is a stronger effect in private firms and in industries characterized by more-
masculine voices. This is consistent with linguistic profiling by judges and firms, but further
research is needed.
We conduct a de-biasing experiment and find that information reduces 40% of the corre-
lation between perceived masculinity and perceived win, and that incentives reduce another
20% when there is information. These findings separately distinguish prejudice from statisti-
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TABLE XXIV
Case Outcomes and Perceived Masculinity
Masculine -0.0875** -0.0972** -0.0858**
(0.0369) (0.0364) (0.0348)
Confident 0.0258 0.0360
(0.0247) (0.0220)
Attractive -0.0171 -0.0197
(0.0181) (0.0144)
Educated 0.0158* 0.0146
(0.00878) (0.00932)
Intelligent 0.00549 0.00635
(0.00893) (0.00783)
Trust -0.00512 -0.00528
(0.00979) (0.00786)
Likely winner -0.00355 -0.00132
(0.00793) (0.00729)
Acoustic Controls No No Yes
Observations 10920 10080 10080
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
cal discrimination. Finally, perceived masculinity explains additional variance beyond and is
orthogonal to the best the prediction models.
Judges responding differently to masculine-sounding voices renders unlikely an explanation
where the entire association is due to perceived masculinity proxying for case weakness. Among
male petitioners, being above or below median in masculine rating is equivalent to 7 percent-
age points in the likelihood of winning. The magnitude of the effects and the stakes of Supreme
Court outcomes (Crawford and Malik 2016) also renders unlikely a compensating salary dif-
ferential whereby less-masculine-sounding males are paid for their higher win rates. Lawyers
become more masculine with experience, while age and experience are cross-sectionally asso-
ciated with less-masculine voices, and lawyers are not making voices less masculine following
a loss, also rendering unlikely an explanation where lawyers and firms learn over time.
Our results also contribute to a growing literature on the relevance of extraneous factors in
courtrooms. Although it is widely assumed that judicial behavior is governed by legal doctrine
(Kornhauser 1999), and that judges strictly hew to legal doctrine and court precedent in their
rulings, judges’ decisions can be affected by their policy preferences (Cameron 1993) and
self-interest (Posner 1973). The associations we find are comparable to the effects of other
external factors that have been shown to influence judicial behavior. Most analyses of judicial
behavior document disparities across judges; judges’ demographic background characteristics,
such as gender, race, and in particular, the party of the appointing president predict judges’
decisions (Peresie 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006). However, a handful of studies examine within-
judge variation, such as the effects of emotional shocks on disposition length stemming from
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unexpected football game losses (Eren and Mocan 2016). Danziger et al. (2011) detect time-
of-day patterns in Israeli judges’ parole decisions. Concretely, they show that parole approval
rates drop with the time from the judges’ last meal. In other work, asylum judges are 2
percentage points more likely to deny asylum to refugees if their previous decision granted
asylum. Likewise, asylum judges are roughly 2 percentage points more likely to grant asylum
on the day after a home-city Sunday football game win instead of a loss. U.S. District judges are
0.3 percentage points less likely to assign any prison length in criminal sentencing cases after
a home-city football game win instead of a loss. And they assign 8% longer prison sentences
when the first letter of the defendant’s name matches the first letter of their own name.
U.S. Presidential elections affect judicial decisions. And the explanatory power of extraneous
factors persist after employing the best prediction models of asylum and sentencing decisions.
See e.g., Berdejo and Chen 2016; Barry et al. 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016; Chen and Prescott
2016; Chen et al. 2016d; 2014; 2016b; 2016. In an analysis of the Supreme Court, Chen et al.
(2016a) examine audio convergence during oral arguments and find that mimicry (phonetic
accommodation) explains additional variation beyond the best predictive models.
There are a variety of directions for future research. One can employ all data back to 1955,
more lawyer covariates (faces, campaign donations, which Justice they clerked for, if any),
more acoustic data, data on Supreme Court clerks (and their ideology) at the time of the
decision, and the subsequent behavior of Justices (number of questions, interruptions). In
a separate paper, Chen et al. (2016c) collects 70% of oral advocates faces from 1998-2012
and analyzes them using a face database to predict perceptions of face. The paper finds
that these features predict decisions. It also uses all audio features of oral advocates from
1955-present and finds that these features also predict decisions beyond the current best
prediction models. Dietrich et al. (2016) also examine audio features from a dataset beginning
in the 1980s and finds that male lawyers with higher pitch are more likely to win, which is
consistent with less masculine-sounding males winning (but it does not elicit human ratings
nor does it restrict to the identical introductory sentences of lawyers). Besides extending the
data backwards in time or extending it to collect more variables, other directions for future
research include experiments that manipulate the presence of text or appearance of faces to
separate the predictive power of audio or facial features from the content of the argument.
Future experiments could manipulate the voices to sound more masculine, or present both
petitioner and respondent clips from a case for raters to evaluate. Ideological mechanisms can
be explored with data measuring the audio—the perceived masculinity/femininity—of male
and female Democrats and Republicans. The de-biasing experiment can measure willingness
to bet that a voice will win in order to elicit a revealed preference measure of confidence in
their beliefs.
Affirmative action typically targets immutable characteristics, but some have asked whether
society should help all women past the glass ceiling (rather than only women who are mas-
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culine) past the glass ceiling: it has been argued, “[o]nce that barrier is broken, there may
be a little less pressure to keep appointing people from that previous excluded category”
(Zweigenhaft 1987; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998). We refrain from policy inference from
these findings for two reasons. First, the welfare consequences of any policy change are un-
known, since they are determined by decisions about what factors to weigh in the social welfare
function. For example, whether ‘fit’ should be a hiring criterion depends on one’s attitude to-
wards fit. Second, for any policy proposal, one also needs to consider the general equilibrium
consequences, which would require the random assignment of laws (Abramowicz et al. 2011;
Belloni et al. 2012; Chen and Yeh 2014a,b; Chen et al. 2014a). However, our results do high-
light the relevance of assimilation and integration, which relates to EU refugee policy and
laïcité which is at least partly based on mutable characteristics. Our results also highlight the
mechanism that social stereotypes and mental stereotypes (snap judgments) associated with
speakers’ words can be relevant for the behavioral response to the speaker, as per the theory
and philosophy of language (Putnam 1973) and recent formal models of economic decision
making (Bordalo et al. 2014).
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TABLE A.1
Advocate Experience at the SCOTUS and Outcomes (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
Petitioner Respondent Both Petitioner Respondent Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
argued only once argued more than once
Masculine -0.00332 0.00994 -0.000833 -0.0238** 0.00900 -0.0145
(0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0132) (0.00938)
Confident 0.00497 -0.00410 0.00511 0.00975 -0.0146 0.00830
(0.00967) (0.00978) (0.00717) (0.00693) (0.00910) (0.00600)
Attractive -0.00159 -0.00731 -0.00345 -0.00417 0.00323 -0.00145
(0.0105) (0.00943) (0.00734) (0.00762) (0.00941) (0.00645)
Intelligent 0.00340 0.00234 0.00364 0.00649 0.00320 0.00707
(0.00854) (0.00829) (0.00593) (0.00669) (0.00747) (0.00526)
Trustworthy -0.00278 -0.00959 -0.00638 0.00418 -0.00950 -0.000708
(0.00729) (0.00699) (0.00503) (0.00557) (0.00723) (0.00465)
Aggressive -0.00194 0.00242 0.000857 -0.00560 0.00183 0.0000956
(0.00915) (0.00813) (0.00644) (0.00632) (0.00825) (0.00550)
Likely winner -0.0146* -0.0278*** -0.0182*** 0.00414 -0.00373 0.00479
(0.00845) (0.00861) (0.00612) (0.00702) (0.00837) (0.00576)
Observations 7620 7579 15199 10045 8422 18467
Notes: Using the normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome among petitioners who argued only once in the Supreme Court from 1998-2012. Column 2
tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with case outcome among respondents who argued only
once in the Supreme Court from 1998-2012. Column 3 tests the same for both sets of advocates. Columns 4-6
do the same as Columns 1-3 but among advocates who argued more than once. Standard errors are clustered
by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.2
Voice Perceptions and Gender (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0173** -0.00975 0.0191 0.0261** -0.0197** -0.0122* 0.0238 0.0172
Feminine (0.00882) (0.00684) (0.0163) (0.0122) (0.00914) (0.00695) (0.0159) (0.0104)
Confident 0.00912 0.00738 -0.0173 0.00792
(0.00591) (0.00465) (0.0166) (0.0125)
Attractive -0.00103 -0.000228 0.00127 -0.0125
(0.00641) (0.00481) (0.0161) (0.0105)
Intelligent 0.00736 0.00747* -0.00410 -0.0126
(0.00534) (0.00401) (0.0211) (0.0152)
Trustworthy 0.00166 -0.00305 -0.00952 0.00663
(0.00450) (0.00343) (0.0130) (0.00831)
Aggressive -0.00496 -0.000718 0.0120 0.00166
(0.00534) (0.00415) (0.0175) (0.0126)
Likely winner -0.00270 -0.00451 0.00786 0.0104
(0.00545) (0.00419) (0.0148) (0.0110)
Observations 18514 35276 2543 5868 17665 33666 2486 5759
Notes: Using the normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome among male petitioners. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated with
case outcome among male advocates. Columns 3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but for femininity among
female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but also control for other perceptual ratings.
Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.3
Gender, Lawyer, and MTurker Rater Controls (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0198** -0.0123* 0.0240 0.0169 -0.00766** -0.00879*** -0.00508 -0.00299
Feminine (0.00913) (0.00695) (0.0161) (0.0105) (0.00372) (0.00312) (0.00427) (0.00529)
Confident 0.00919 0.00747 -0.0179 0.00816 0.00396 0.00276 0.00482 -0.000308
(0.00591) (0.00463) (0.0170) (0.0126) (0.00301) (0.00270) (0.00896) (0.00630)
Attractive -0.00134 -0.000239 0.000382 -0.0123 -0.000188 0.00103 0.000512 -0.00288
(0.00641) (0.00481) (0.0161) (0.0105) (0.00275) (0.00242) (0.00421) (0.00474)
Intelligent 0.00744 0.00743* -0.00446 -0.0129 0.00291 0.00336 0.00535 0.00661
(0.00531) (0.00400) (0.0210) (0.0153) (0.00240) (0.00215) (0.00714) (0.00661)
Trustworthy 0.00142 -0.00314 -0.00995 0.00671 0.00166 0.000696 0.00472 0.00697
(0.00448) (0.00342) (0.0130) (0.00833) (0.00237) (0.00201) (0.00370) (0.00441)
Aggressive -0.00493 -0.000701 0.0119 0.00113 0.00280 -0.000389 -0.00302 -0.000171
(0.00533) (0.00414) (0.0180) (0.0127) (0.00265) (0.00227) (0.00539) (0.00661)
Likely winner -0.00237 -0.00441 0.00871 0.0103 0.00294 0.00414 -0.00905* 0.00117
(0.00542) (0.00419) (0.0151) (0.0110) (0.00293) (0.00276) (0.00528) (0.00500)
MTurker controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lawyer FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17665 33666 2486 5759 17665 33666 2486 5759
Notes: Using the normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcome for male petitioners controlling for rater characteristics. Column 2 tests whether perceived
masculinity is associated with case outcome for male advocates controlling for rater characteristics. Columns
3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but for femininity among female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as
Columns 1-4 but also control for lawyer fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.4
Voice Perceptions and Gender (normalized ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0580* -0.0314 0.122 0.152** -0.0762* -0.0357 0.381* 0.166
Feminine (0.0305) (0.0228) (0.106) (0.0709) (0.0456) (0.0334) (0.215) (0.144)
Confident 0.177** 0.106 -0.454* -0.0409
(0.0887) (0.0666) (0.262) (0.172)
Attractive -0.0385 -0.00770 0.0757 -0.107
(0.0637) (0.0457) (0.205) (0.140)
Intelligent 0.0689 0.108* -0.0336 -0.00119
(0.0814) (0.0583) (0.146) (0.107)
Trustworthy 0.0117 -0.0582 -0.241 0.102
(0.0769) (0.0567) (0.256) (0.153)
Aggressive -0.0995 -0.0209 0.206 -0.0168
(0.0705) (0.0546) (0.187) (0.133)
Likely winner -0.0697 -0.105 0.111 0.0214
(0.0906) (0.0708) (0.269) (0.185)
Observations 856 1634 116 267 856 1634 116 267
Notes: Using the average normalized rating per advocate, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcome among male petitioners. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity is
associated with case outcome among male advocates. Columns 3-4 do the same as Columns 1-2 but for
femininity among female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but also control for other
perceptual ratings. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
TABLE A.5
Correlations of Trait judgments with Masculine (Feminine) Ratings (normalized ratings,
micro level)
Variable Male raters Female raters
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Confident 0.4234 0.446 0.4598 0.4877
Attractive 0.3068 0.2244 0.3686 0.2408
Intelligent 0.194 0.0478 0.2714 0.0793
Trustworthy 0.2058 0.4202 0.1948 0.3997
Aggressive 0.3223 0.3226 0.3603 0.3023
Likely winner 0.3909 0.5031 0.4351 0.5346
Notes: This table presents the correlation between other perceptual ratings and masculine (feminine) rating
for each combination of male or female advocate rated by male or female raters.
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TABLE A.6
Voice Perceptions and Gender Match (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male raters Female raters
Male advocate Female advocate Male advocate Female advocate
Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both Petitioner Both
Masculine/ -0.0228** -0.0150** 0.0125 0.0130 -0.0158 -0.00888 0.0319 0.0205
Feminine (0.00957) (0.00740) (0.0205) (0.0132) (0.0107) (0.00802) (0.0203) (0.0127)
Confident 0.00884 0.00714 -0.0212 0.00395 0.00927 0.00757 -0.0133 0.0114
(0.00767) (0.00586) (0.0234) (0.0151) (0.00795) (0.00605) (0.0187) (0.0143)
Attractive 0.00627 0.00312 -0.00757 -0.0180 -0.00803 -0.00361 0.00940 -0.00719
(0.00712) (0.00545) (0.0241) (0.0150) (0.00819) (0.00625) (0.0171) (0.0122)
Intelligent 0.0129* 0.0111** -0.0108 -0.0173 0.00188 0.00377 0.00186 -0.00849
(0.00681) (0.00499) (0.0218) (0.0166) (0.00681) (0.00511) (0.0258) (0.0173)
Trustworthy -0.00120 -0.00386 0.000968 0.0101 0.00449 -0.00199 -0.0193 0.00368
(0.00622) (0.00477) (0.0200) (0.0113) (0.00605) (0.00462) (0.0180) (0.0120)
Aggressive -0.00656 -0.00376 0.00307 -0.00545 -0.00354 0.00250 0.0199 0.00869
(0.00686) (0.00527) (0.0237) (0.0151) (0.00654) (0.00532) (0.0186) (0.0142)
Likely winner -0.0000673 0.000217 0.0191 0.0160 -0.00508 -0.00957* -0.000289 0.00493
(0.00730) (0.00573) (0.0235) (0.0144) (0.00705) (0.00564) (0.0176) (0.0144)
Observations 8736 16606 1141 2605 8929 17060 1345 3154
Notes: Using the normalized perceptual ratings, Column 1 tests whether perceived masculinity is associated
with case outcomes for male petitioners rated by male raters. Column 2 tests whether perceived masculinity
is associated with case outcomes for male advocates rated by male raters. Columns 3-4 do the same as
Columns 1-2 but for femininity among female advocates. Columns 5-8 do the same as Columns 1-4 but for
ratings by female raters. Standard errors are clustered by case. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
TABLE VII
Additional Perceptions (normalized ratings, case level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1)
Masculine -0.555***
(0.179)
Confident 0.379
(0.300)
Attitude -0.020
(0.283)
Competent 0.588
(0.405)
Empathy 0.212
(0.286)
Respect -0.389
(0.320)
Likely winner -0.367
(0.259)
Observations 60
R-squared 0.179
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TABLE VIII
Additional Perceptions (normalized ratings, micro level)
Dependent Variable: Case Outcome (win = 1, lose = 0)
(1)
Masculine -0.080**
(0.031)
Confident 0.020
(0.027)
Attitude 0.005
(0.019)
Competent 0.017
(0.019)
Empathy 0.006
(0.014)
Respect -0.003
(0.016)
Likely winner -0.008
(0.021)
Observations 1260
R-squared 0.021
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Figure 1: First Screenshot of Experiment
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Figure 2: Second Screenshot of Experiment
Figure 3: Third Screenshot of Experiment
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Figure 4: Fourth Screenshot of Experiment
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